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Abstract 
 
This Article challenges the common wisdom about the desirability of celebrated trademarks. 
Contrary to the traditional view, it argues that mega-brands are neither economic evils nor is their 
function limited to imparting information regarding the physical product they flaunt. The Article 
also rejects the view that famous marks persuade consumers (often referred to as “Snobs”) to “ir-
rationally” pay more for the same physical product they could have purchased for less. Rather, it 
argues that in purchasing a branded good the consumer is actually purchasing three tied products 
in one package: a physical product, information about the physical product, and an intangible 
product such as fame, prestige, peace of mind or a pleasant feeling. Contrary to prior literature, 
this Article argues that the intangible product benefits both producers and consumers. It explores 
the demand for the intangible product, its impact on pricing, welfare and consumers’ and produc-
ers’ strategies. It argues that under certain conditions one may witness the anomaly of an increase 
in both price and output, but that such observation does not mandate the conclusion that consum-
ers are facing an up-sloping demand curve as discussed in the literature of conspicuous goods. 
Instead, the Article proposes that this phenomenon may occur in the traditional down-sloping 
demand curves and that it is not limited to goods with conspicuous properties. The Article has 
normative and descriptive implications with regard to three distinct bodies of law: price discrimi-
nation, trademark anti-dilution and trade-name law. A direct result is that mega-brands neither 
confer a monopoly nor foster price discrimination. On the contrary, they enhance competition in 
both the physical and intangible spheres. The Article also offers a new rational basis for one of 
the most nebulous doctrines in trademark law: anti-dilution. Anti-dilution law provides special 
protection to famous marks which is not available to regular ones, and has been unanimously en-
throned as one which protects only producers but is injurious to consumers. Conversely, this Arti-
cle argues that anti-dilution law inures to the benefit of both consumers and producers. It attempts 
to clear the constitutional concerns that have been raised with regard to the doctrine and explains 
the fame requirement. The article concludes that Snobs are rational and that there are sound eco-
nomic justifications for the law’s unique protection of famous marks. 
                                                     
∗ John M. Olin Scholar in Law and Economics, The University of Chicago School of Law; Doctorate 
Candidate (J.S.D) University of Chicago; LL.M. University of Chicago; J.D. Bar-Ilan University; B.A. in 
Economics Bar-Ilan University. I would like to thank William Landes, Lisa Bernstein, Bernard Harcourt, 
Ariel Porat, Gil Sadka, Neta Gottlieb, Abby Moncrieff and the participants of the Legal Scholarship Work-
shop at the University of Chicago and the Intellectual Property Workshop at the Hebrew University. All 
mistakes are my own. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The primary value of the modern trademark lies in the conditioned reflex devel-
oped in the buyer... To the extent that advertising of this type succeeds… 
[e]conomically irrational elements are introduced into consumer choices; and the 
trademark owner is insulated from the normal pressures of price and quality 
competition. In consequence the competitive system fails to perform its function of 
allocating available resources efficiently. Moreover, the economically irrelevant 
appeal of highly publicized trademarks is thought to constitute a barrier to the en-
try of new competition into the market… In some markets this barrier to entry 
may be insuperable.” – Judge  Browning in Smith v. Chanel 1 
 
“People like to get what they think they are getting, and courts have steadfastly 
refused in this class of cases to demand justification for their preferences.  Shoddy 
and petty motives may control those preferences; but if the buyers wish to be 
snobs, the law will protect them in their snobbery.” – Judge L. Hand in Benton 
Announcements, Inc. v. FTC2 
 
“The public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice may be dictated 
by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance.” – Justice Cardozo in FTC v. 
Algoma Lumber Co.3 
 
 
This article seeks to answer two basic questions: First, why are some consumers (of-
ten referred to as Snobs)4 willing to pay more for a product which is often available for 
much less simply because it bears a famous trademark? And second should the law pro-
tect Snobs in their preferences? The law’s answer to the first question is that Snobs are 
irrational because celebrated trademarks5 and persuasive advertising6 play upon their sus-
ceptibilities. Famous trademarks have also been accused of other economic evils: enhanc-
ing product differentiation, raising barriers of entry and wasting resources that could have 
been used to produce “real goods.” At the same time, however, the law protects these ir-
rational preferences and thus enables sellers of branded products to charge higher prices 
than those charged for identical non-branded goods.7 The law does so by securing con-
sumers’ “misperception” that physically identical products are, in fact, different. Trade-
mark anti-dilution law, for example, protects famous marks (but not “regular” ones) 
against erosion of their image. It thus maintains the very magnetism which distinguish 
them from generic products. Trade-name law achieves the same by prohibiting sellers 
                                                     
1 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir., 1968). 
2 Benton Announcements, Inc. v. FTC, 130 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir., 1942). 
3 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (U.S. 1934). 
4 In using the term “Snob” I do not wish to take any moral stand but rather describe a phenomenon. 
5 I use the term trademark here in a broad sense to include all trade-symbols. 
6 By persuasive advertising I mean advertising that does not provide (directly) information about the 
physical product it goads. See also infra notes 15, 17-19 and accompanying text. 
7 Note that protecting famous marks is, in fact, protecting Snobbism. The law protects both as is evident 
from the excerpts above. See also Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d 
Cir., 1943) (“There appears to be a related judicial policy of protecting snobbism”). 
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from using misdescriptive terms to inform consumers that physically identical products 
which are branded differently are in fact the same.8 This paradoxical approach—the law’s 
protection of consumers’ “irrationality” and of famous trademarks—is perplexing. Why 
should the law protect Snobbery if it leads to anticompetitive outcomes? Should not the 
law be aimed at breaking down what it regards to be irrational preferences of the buying 
public? The puzzle is even greater since “protecting” capricious decisions, on its face, 
injures the very consuming public whose welfare the law seeks to promote.9 
 
This article offers an economic rationale for the law’s protection of famous marks. It 
starts by challenging the assumption that consumers’ willingness to pay for branded 
product is irrational. It argues that branding (a term I use for both famous marks and the 
persuasive advertising that promotes them) is an economic “good” rather than a “bad”10 
and that the consumers’ seemingly caprice-driven decisions are, in fact, rational and wel-
fare maximizing. More specifically, the article is based on the recognition that when pur-
chasing a branded good the consumer receives three products in one package: a physical 
product (e.g., a watch, a car or a pocketbook), information with regard to the physical 
product (e.g., it is a product worth buying, it is made of certain materials, at a certain lo-
cality etc) and an intangible product such as fame, prestige, peace of mind or a pleasant 
feeling. 
 
Part II discusses the three most common approaches to branding and the intangible 
product that it creates: the “hard liners” who believe that consumers are irrational and 
branding is a waste; the “soft-liners” who value branding only to the extent that it pro-
vides information with regard to the product’s physical qualities; and the “middle-liners” 
who recognize the psychological effect of branding. Part III discusses the legal protection 
accorded to famous marks and snobbish preferences. It concludes that courts and jurists 
have adopted a hard-line premise (famous marks are harmful) but a soft-line conclusion 
(famous marks and thus snobbism should be protected). 
 
Part IV undertakes to resolve the inconsistency in the law by adopting the middle-
liner’s view that a branded product is, in actuality, a bundle of three products, arguing 
that the intangible product has a social value. It then explores the normative and positive 
implications of this explanation on the laws of trademark anti-dilution and price discrimi-
                                                     
8 The following example based on the facts of FTC v. Royal Milling 288 U.S. 212 (1933) is illustrative. 
Assume Snobs prefer to purchase high-priced flour that is prepared by grinders rather than the low-priced 
flour sold by sellers who do not grind themselves, even though the two types of flour are physically identi-
cal. If the law allowed non-grinders to use (falsely) the word “Mill” in their trade-name, consumers would 
be misled because they would believe that the seller had ground its own flour. But they would be misled to 
their financial benefit. They would receive the very physical product they intended to purchase at a lower 
price. At the same time, producers would not be worse-off. Absent passing-off, producers would still be 
able to reap the fruits of their investments. In number of decisions, however, the Supreme Court, has pro-
hibited sellers from including a misdescriptive term in their trade-names. The result is that on its face, by 
protecting consumers in their snobbery the law harms them. 
9 See example in supra note 8. 
10 G. Becker and K. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as A Good or Bad, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 108, No. 4 (Nov., 1993), 941-964. The authors define a “good” as something consumers 
are willing to pay for and a “bad” as something consumers pay to have removed or must be compensated to 
accept. 
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nation. Anti-dilution has been enthroned as a theory that “has proven wholly resistant to 
analysis”11 and one that is injurious to consumers. Conversely, this article argues that 
anti-dilution law inures to the benefit of both consumers and producers. For the producer, 
it is forward looking: it protects the ability of the mark to generate future sales. For the 
consumer, it is backward looking: it protects her pre-purchase expectations and the value 
of the intangible product she purchased. Because when a consumer buys a branded prod-
uct she purchases a physical product (a Gucci bag) on which an intangible asset piggy-
backs (a pleasant association or prestige) but receives to her possession only the physical 
product, dilution imposes an externality. A third party may cause the consumer an injury 
if he tarnishes the pleasant aura for which the consumer paid.  
 
Part IV also offers a new interpretation for the Robinson Patman Act in order to 
square price discrimination law – whose goal is to ensure that identical products are sold 
at the same price – with trademark law which, by protecting the allure of mega-brands, 
enables sellers of branded product to charge higher prices than those charged for generic 
goods. It argues that persuasive branding neither confers a monopoly nor fosters price 
discrimination. Competition exists both in the physical and intangible spheres. In the in-
tangible sphere, a Cartier watch, a Ferrari car and a Gucci bag all compete for the atten-
tion of the buyer who wishes to purchase fame and status. Another conclusion is that 
physically identical articles may carry different intangible freights. This explains why the 
law should allow a producer to brand physically identical products under different marks 
and charge different prices without being suspected of engaging in a discriminatory activ-
ity or subject to an antitrust inquiry. 
 
Part V constructs a formal model which breaks down the demand for a branded prod-
uct into the three components. Unlike the literature on advertising, the article does not 
assume that branding “gives favorable notice to other goods.”12 In this respect, it also de-
viates from the signaling models which argue that the role of branding is limited to im-
parting information about the physical product that advertisements endorse.13 Instead, it 
claims that branding creates a new intangible good that must piggyback on the physical 
one. The model further explains why branding occurs in a market with incomplete infor-
mation as well as in a perfectly competitive market. It also differs from the prior literature 
by providing a theoretical framework that takes into account both the informational and 
persuasive value of branding. Part VI offers concluding remarks. 
 
II. THE APPROACHES TO PERSUASIVE BRANDING 
 
Persuasive branding comprises a large segment of the economy. Jurists, psychologists 
and economists have tried to explain the purposes served by the ever-growing advertising 
outlays and have tried to measure their impact on consumption, culture and welfare. 
Many have reached the conclusion that branding’s sole purpose is to serve one master: 
                                                     
11 J. Moskin, Dilution Law: At a Crossroad? Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of trademark 
Protection, 83 TMR 122 (1993). 
12 Becker and Murphy, supra note 10 at 942, 945. Becker and Murphy argue that advertisements raise the 
demand for physical goods. This paper adopts the view that they create a new intangible product. 
13 This approach is mainly attributed to Phillip Nelson. See infra notes 25 and accompanying text. 
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the producer and that it is nothing more than a drain on the economy.14 Why do producers 
invest so much money in advertising containing very little or no (direct) information? Is 
branding desirable? This section addresses these questions.  
 
A. The “Hard Liners”: Branding Is a “Bad” 
 
Some economists take a “hard line” position against branding calling for its eradica-
tion. They believe that it is merely a wasteful attempt15 to change consumers’ prefer-
ences16, increase barriers to entry17 and promote artificial product differentiation.18 
Brands and brand loyalty are said to leads to the creation of monopolies and enable 
manufacturers to command supra-competitive prices and insulate themselves from the 
chills and fevers of competition.19 Some maintain that persuasive advertising is even im-
moral and that it enhances another social ill: materialism. Most notably, however, propo-
nents of this school of thought perceive the consumer as irrational and infinitely gullible. 
                                                     
14 In the year 2003 alone the top 100 international marketers have increased advertising expenditures by 
11.6% culminating in a total of $82.83 billion (comparing to a 7.1% growth in 2002 and a 2.6% decline in 
2001). Of these 100 marketers, 25 spent more than $1 billion on advertising. U.S. based firms (defined by 
headquarter location) accounted for $40.36 billion. Spending by the top 200 mega-brands accounted for 
$41.4 billion of the $128.4 billion domestic advertising spending. In 2001 and 2002, advertising-to-sale 
ratios of over 10% have been found in the following industries: beverages, perfume and cosmetics, liquors, 
dolls and stuffed toys, motion pictures, and games and toys. Even in research-based industries (such as 
pharmaceuticals) promotion outlays can be two to four times larger than the budget for R&D. See M. Hur-
witz and R. Caves, Persuasion or Information? Promotion and the Shares of Brand Name and Generic 
Pharmaceuticals, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3 (1988), 299-320. 
15 H. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society (1948); Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967); R. 
Pitofsky, Changing Focus in the Regulation of Advertising (published in Yale Brozen, Advertising and So-
ciety (1974) at 125-147 (hereinafter “Brozen”) (arguing at p. 126: that “the case for direct regulation [of 
advertising] at bottom depends on the ability to draw a line between “informative” advertising... and wholly 
“persuasive”…The argument that such [persuasive] efforts are socially wasteful is particularly compel-
ling”); N. Economides, Trademarks (New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law); J. K. Galbraith, 
The Affluent Society (1998) at 125-130; R. H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Money and Happiness in an Era of 
Excess (1999) at 5, 11-12, 44 (“luxury goods... cost real resources to produce, resources that we could have 
put to other uses”). 
16 Bain J., Barriers to New Competition, Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries 
(1956); Galbraith (1998) supra note 15, at 125-130; Narayanan et al, The Informative versus Persuasive 
Role of Marketing Communication in New Product Categories: An Application to the prescription Antihis-
tamines Market (unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 2002) at p.11 (defining persuasive adver-
tising as “marketing activities and events [that] enter the physician utility function directly and change her 
tastes”). 
17 Bain (1956), supra note 16, at 227; Hurwitz and Caves (1988), supra note 14, at 300.  
18 Becker and Murphy, supra note 10 start their paper by noting that “most economists and other intellec-
tuals have not liked advertisements that provide little information. Noninformative advertising is claimed to 
create ants [to which the authors agree] and to change and distort tastes”. 
19 Chamberlain, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (5th edition, 1946); T. Veblen, The Theory of 
Business Enterprise (1927) at 55 (“The end sought by the systematic advertising of the larger business con-
cerns is such a monopoly of custom and prestige. This form of monopoly is sometimes of great value, and 
is frequently sold under the name of good-will, trademarks, brands etc… The great end of consistent adver-
tising is to establish such differential monopolies resting on popular conviction”); W. Commanor and T. 
Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure, and Performance, Review of Economics and Statistics 49, No.4 
(1967), p.423-440 (cited by Phillip Nelson, The Economic Consequences of Advertising, The Journal of 
Business, Vol. 48 No. 2 (1975), 213 at p.219; Hurwitz and Caves (1988), supra note 14; Galbraith (1998) 
supra note 15, at 127 n4. 
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They also make a clear distinction between “real” (or “physical”) goods - the value of 
which they recognize - and illusionary or “prestige” goods (actually “bads”), which they 
consider wasteful. The following excerpt is typical: 
 
“Buyer preferences for certain products are developed and shaped by the persua-
sive sales-promotion activities of sellers, and particularly advertising… advertis-
ing, and other sales promotion may of course be primarily “informational” in its 
impact. But in fact the bulk of advertising is instead primarily “persuasive”. It is 
aimed at creating product preferences thorough generally phrased praises of the 
attributes of various outputs… Thus an important category of product differentia-
tion is built primarily on a non rational or emotional basis, through the efforts of 
the ‘ad-man’… the possibility of developing significant product differentiation 
through advertising… is greatly enhanced for so-called ‘gift goods’ or ‘prestige 
goods’… and those that though not given away are similarly bought with the mo-
tive of gaining the admiration or gratitude of others [emphasis added].”20 
 
Luxury goods and real goods, they argue, satisfy two different needs.21 First in time 
and importance are the “real” needs. These lead to the production of more food for the 
hungry, more clothing for the cold and more houses for the homeless. As a society be-
comes more affluent, more desires are created. These lower-order needs are the fruits of 
prodigal outlays and psychologically grounded.22 This approach has found a strong foot-
hold among legal scholars.23 Professor Brown, for example, analogizes branding to a 
                                                     
20 Bain, Industrial Organization (Second Ed., 1968), p.227. See also Chamberlain, The Theory of Mo-
nopolistic Competition (Eight ed., 1962), p.119 (arguing that “selling methods which play upon the buyer’s 
susceptibilities, which use against him laws of psychology... against which he cannot defend himself, which 
frighten or flatter or disarm him – all of these have nothing to do with his knowledge. They are not infor-
mative, they are manipulative”). For Chamberlain the art of the advertiser is akin to that of the hypnotist 
who wishes to gain control of the buyer’s consciousness. Id at p.133. See also M. McLuhan, Ads: Keeping 
Upset with the Joneses (published in J. Wright and J. Mertes,  Advertising’s Role in Society (1974) (here-
inafter “W&M”) at p. 6) (“ads are quite in accord with the procedure of brain washing... They are intended 
as subliminal pills for the subconscious in order to exercise an hypnotic spell.”). 
21 Galbraith, supra note 15; Galbraith, The management of Specific Demand (published in W&M at 135-
136); T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) at Chapter 4. 
22 See also H. G, Johnson, Apologia for Ad Men (published in W&M at p. 242-243) (“increasing wealth 
means the capacity to satisfy wants of a decreasingly urgent kind – wants of  a psychological and socio-
logical origin, rather than wants originating in biological needs for food, clothing and shelter”). As 
Galbraith (1998) notes: even “the most retarded student in the nation’s most primitive school of business 
administration” would recognize that “wants can be synthesized by advertising, catalyzed by salesmanship, 
and shaped by the discreet manipulations of the persuaders.” 
23 Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and The Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, The Yale 
Law Journal V. 57 No. 7 (1948) p. 1165; C. Auerbach, Quality Standards, Informative Labeling, And 
Grade Labeling As Guides To Consumer Buying, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring, 
1949), p. 362-393; Joseph M. Livermore, On Uses of a Competitor’s Trademark, Stanford Law Review, 
Vol. 20, No.3 (Feb., 1968), 448-458 at p. 449-50; M. Davis, Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical 
Look at Trademark Use, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 233 (1985); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling 
Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 789 (1997) at p., 856-57 and at p. 
858 (“Where product differentiation results from differences in the products’ tangible characteristics or 
quality, informed consumers rationally pay the premium. But where product differentiation is built primar-
ily on a nonrational or emotional basis, through the efforts of the ‘ad-man,’ consumer willingness to pay the 
premium proves economically inefficient”) (Recently cited in Moseley v. V-Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 
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black art whose goal is to sell illusions to the irrational consumer. He concludes that “the 
resources, measured in billions, going into persuasive advertising, result only in a cur-
tailed output of real goods.”24 Under his view the law should protect only informative 
advertising and reject anti-dilution laws, which he deems “the clear most candid and far 
reaching claim on behalf of persuasive values.”25 
 
B. The “Soft Liners”: Branding Is Information 
 
Another group of economic theorists views branding as a good because it conveys 
useful information about a product’s attribute and quality.26 They explain that if a con-
sumer has had a bad experience with a product, then an advertisement or a trademark will 
revive in her memory the bad experience she had and would consequently lead to a de-
crease in consumption.27 The result is that only sellers with good product will find it prof-
itable to brand them. Under this view branding serve as a screening mechanisms the sig-
nal to consumers which products are good and which are faulty. The soft-liners, however, 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. 418, 432 (2003)); J. Litman, Breakfast With Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 
Yale Law Journal (1999). 
24 Brown, supra note 23, at 1179, 1165, 1169 (“The demand for modern advertising, a black art whose 
practitioners are part of the larger army which employs threats, cajolery, emotions, personality, persistence 
and facts in what is termed aggressive selling”). Professor Brown notes that advertising has two main pur-
poses: to inform and to persuade. Id. at p. 1183. To the extent advertising provides consumers with infor-
mation it has a social utility. Thus, “in a pure economy [full information], advertising… would only add to 
the costs, and decrease the profit, of any firm”. Id at p. 1169-71.  
25 Id at p. 1183. Of this critical view is also Klieger, supra note 23, whose article has been recently cited 
by the Supreme Court in Moseley v. V-Secret Catalogue, Inc. 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (the Supreme Court 
relied on Klieger’s article in raising questions as to the applicability of dilution by tarnishment.. Klieger, at 
p.857 accuses dilution of protecting persuasive values and artificial product differentiation that are “built 
primarily on a non-rational or emotional basis.” See also Callmann, Callmann on Unfair Competition, 
Trademarks and Monopolies at 7:29 p. 7-151 (“Although the independent value of the well known trade-
mark, its function as a means of identifying the article and as a guarantee of qualitative continuity and the 
economic value because of its irrational appeal were duly noted by the supreme court it is now clear that 
famous trademark cannot be relied upon to justify a price differential, if the products are not physically 
different”). 
26 See P. Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, Journal of Political Economy 78, No. 2 (1970); P. 
Nelson, Advertising as Information, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, No. 4 (1974a); P. Nelson, 
The Economic Value of Advertising, Brozen, supra note 15; P. Nelson (1975) supra note 19. Nelson ex-
plained that because there is no theory of taste changes, the approach cannot lead to behavioral predications 
and thus should be dismissed altogether (“I find the hypothesis that advertising changes tastes intellectually 
unsatisfactory. We economists have no theory of taste changes, so this approach leads to no behavioral pre-
dictions. The intuition of one group of economists are matched against the intuition of other economists 
with no clear resolution”). Id at p. 219. See also G. Stigler and G. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputan-
dum (matters of taste are not to be disputed), The American Economic Review Vol. 67, No. 2 (Mar, 1977) 
p. 76-90. But see R. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 
1977), 1 at p. 10. After quoting the citation above Professor Coase notes that he “would have thought that 
the belief that advertising had some effect on tastes… was shared by everyone who is willing to agree that 
tastes can change. No doubt Professor Nelson is correct when he says that we do not have a theory of 
tastes. But ignorance about a subject seems an inadequate reason for not studying it”. Only three years 
after Nelson’s article, Dixit and Norman (D-N), published a paper that developed a controversial frame-
work to analyze changes in taste due to persuasive advertising (Advertising and Welfare, The Bell Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 9 No. 1 (1978) p. 1-17).  
27 The analysis is with regard to products characterized by repeat purchasers and experience qualities 
(i.e., qualities that consumers learn by experience, such as the taste of canned tuna). 
Shahar Dilbary: Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs” 
8 
do not look beyond the physical product. They do not believe that the branding serves a 
psychological role. To them, branding has no value besides its ability to convey the in-
formation that the physical product it promotes is a winner. Thus, in utopia, where per-
fect information is abundant, even they would agree that branding is wasteful.28  
 
C. The “Middle-Liners”: A Rational Choice Approach 
 
In between the position of the hard-liners who deplore the effects of persuasive 
branding and the soft-liners who view it as a means to communicate information about 
the physical product, is a group that takes an intermediate approach. Members of this fac-
tion recognize the informational value of branding but also pays attention to its psycho-
logical effects. They argue that advertising adds a new value to the existing physical 
product. It is, therefore, rational rather than irrational for consumer to consider in making 
their purchasing decisions. To use Demsetz example, “pork to a religious Muslim hardly 
offers the same value that it does to a Christian. Nothing is intrinsic about the values of 
commodities and services. Their worth depends on how we perceive them… Underlying 
the idea that commodities have intrinsic value is the belief that we are motivated by basic 
stable and simple wants. If man was ever so motivated, that time has long passed.”29 
 
In sum, many theorists have tried to provide an explanation of the value or lack of 
value associated with branding and persuasive advertising; yet none of the theories de-
veloped to date provides an explanation that systematizes the judicial decisions. The re-
mainder of this paper attempts to do just that. Building on the middle-liners, it wishes to 
convince the reader that persuasive branding indeed adds value to the physical product. 
As is shown in the next part, in a modern society even the most basic goods, such as 
flour, gas, lumber and meat, have in them more than the tangible qualities that the eyes 
meet or the hands feel. They carry an intangible psychological value which is worth pro-
tecting. 
                                                     
28 See also Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1 (Feb., 1992) (“Under conditions of perfect compe-
tition, there is no advertising because consumers are assumed to be endowed at the outset with perfect in-
formation and thus have no need for it. In the imperfect real world, though, consumers have imperfect 
knowledge. The need for information creates the need for advertising”); Brown, supra note 23, at 1170. 
29 Demsetz, Advertising in The Affluent Society (published in Brozen, supra note 15, at. 67, 75. As Levitt 
noted several years earlier, “civilization is a man’s attempt to transcend his ancient animality; and this in-
cludes both art and advertising” (T. Levitt, Advertising and its Adversaries (published in W&M, Advertis-
ing’s Role in Society (1974) at p. 248); Levitt, The Morality of Advertising, Harvard Business Review 
(1970)). The Desmetzian theory that commodities are basic building blocks whose value is determined by 
consumers’ perception was modeled by Stigler and Becker (1977), supra note 26. In their article “De 
Gustibus Non Est Disputandum” (matters of taste are not to be disputed) the authors propose a new theory 
of consumers’ choice. Unlike the traditional theory where consumers maximize their utility function di-
rectly from the goods purchased, in their reformulation consumers maximize utility from commodities they 
produce with goods, their own time, skills and other inputs such as advertising. To illustrate, consider the 
utility a consumer gets from playing tennis. The game itself is the “commodity” that enters the utility func-
tion. The racquet, balls and their brand names are just inputs. The consumer does not buy them to own 
them per-se. She gets no utility from the goods themselves. They are used to “manufacture” the game (see: 
Len M. Nichols, Advertising and Economics Welfare, The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 1 
(Mar., 1985) p. 213-218). Unlike Stigler and Becker this article perceives trademarks not as input but rather 
as containing an intangible end-product, which enters directly to the consumer utility function. 
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III. TRADEMARK & TRADE-NAME LAWS: PROTECTING SNOBS 
 
Trademark and trade-name laws’ approach to persuasive branding is inconsistent. It 
suffers from a “hard-line”–“soft-line” schizophrenia. It adopts a “hard-line” premise: ex-
plicitly stating that Snobs are irrational and branding exploits their susceptibilities. But 
instead of fighting what it perceives to be anticompetitive, (as the hard-liners do) it 
adopts a “soft-line” solution: it protects famous marks and thereby Snobbism thus enables 
sellers of branded products to charge higher prices than those charged for identical non-
branded goods. Indeed, in a series of cases, the Supreme Court has fully embraced the 
hard-liners’ view that consumers are often irrational in their purchasing decisions. Per-
suasive branding, held Justice Harlan, may “undeniably… [be] used to create irrational 
brand preferences and to mislead consumers as to the actual differences between prod-
ucts.”30 Its object is “to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power 
of a congenial symbol rather than to communicate information as to quality or price.”31 
Trademarks were even accused of possessing Pavlovian capabilities, creating a “condi-
tioned reflex” in buyers’ minds.32 It was held that to the extent that persuasive branding 
succeeds:  
 
“…economically irrational elements are introduced into consumer choices; and 
the trademark [or trade-name] owner is insulated from the normal pressures of 
price and quality competition. In consequence the competitive system fails to per-
form its function of allocating available resources efficiently. Moreover, the eco-
nomically irrelevant appeal of highly publicized trademarks is thought to consti-
tute a barrier to the entry of new competition into the market. . . . In some markets 
this barrier to entry may be insuperable [emphasis added].”33 
 
The judicial approach is paradoxical and suffers from schizophrenia because rather 
than fighting what it believes to be artificial product differentiation, misallocation of re-
sources and social waste, the courts protect consumers’ capricious decisions. They help to 
maintain consumers’ perception that branded and non-branded products are different.  
 
As early as 1933, the Supreme Court held that “if consumers or dealers prefer to pur-
chase a given article because it was made by a particular manufacturer [Armani, Gucci, 
etc.] . . . , they have a right to do so and this right cannot be satisfied by imposing upon 
them an exactly similar article, or one equally as good.”34 In Royal Milling Company, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found the defendants’ use of the words “Mill” or 
“Milling” in their trade names to be misleading (in violation of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act) because they were sellers but not grinders of flour. On appeal, 
both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States ac-
knowledged that the consuming public possessed the “unfounded belief” that flour 
bought directly from grinders is superior to that sold by the defendants. Yet the opinions 
                                                     
30 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603 (U.S., 1967). 
31 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
32 Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d at 567. 
33 Id. 
34 Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933). 
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differed in their willingness to protect consumers in their “irrational belief.” Focusing on 
the product’s physical characteristics, the Court of Appeals dismissed the order.35 It 
found that the two types of flour (those made by grinders and those mixed and sold by the 
defendants) were of the same quality, made under the same process with the same ma-
chinery, and were therefore identical. The finding that the products were identical led the 
Court of Appeals to the conclusion that there was no public injury or financial loss. For 
the Court of Appeals, the public received exactly what it sought to receive.36 The fact that 
the public wanted flour sold directly by grinders believing it is different from flour sold 
by the defendants was of no consequence. In fact, the public seems to be better off: It has 
received the same flour at a cheaper price. The Supreme Court reversed. It held that be-
cause consumers believed that flour prepared by original grinders is of superior quality, 
the result of the defendants’ use of the word “Milling” was that consumers were “de-
ceived into purchasing an article which they do not wish or intend to buy.” It found de-
ception even though the consumer received the same physical product they intended to 
buy. In so doing, the Supreme Court broadened the law of unfair competition to protect 
consumers not only against deception with regard to the product’s physical attributes, but 
also from deceit with regard to the product’s psychological value. It protected consumers’ 
perception, even if emotionally-based, irrational or unfounded. 
 
Less than a year after the Royal Milling holding, a similar case arrived before the Su-
preme Court.37 This time it was the holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that 
was dismissed on the same grounds. In Algoma Lumber, the FTC issued a cease and de-
sist order against lumber suppliers who marketed lumber as “California White Pine” al-
though it was biologically “Yellow Pine.” While aware of the Royal Milling holding, the 
Court of Appeals annulled the order explaining that the two types of woods were “so 
nearly equal in utility that buyers [were] not injured, even though misled.” The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that even if the two types of lumber were equivalent, consumers 
are nevertheless prejudiced “if upon giving an order for one thing, they are supplied with 
something else.” In such matters, the Court noted, “the public is entitled to get what it 
chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by igno-
rance.”38  
                                                     
35 Royal Milling Co. v. Federal Trade Commission., 58 F.2d 581 (6th Cir., 1932). 
36 Id. (“It is not shown that the petitioners’ product is injurious to the consumer, or that it is in any way 
different from or inferior to the product of their competitors”). 
37 Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 78. 
38 If one needed a reassurance that the law of trademark and unfair competition recognize the psychologi-
cal effect branding may have on consumers, such a proof was provided by Judge Frankfurter in Mishawaka 
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co., 316 U.S. at 205 (“The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the 
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase 
goods by them.  A trademark is a merchandising shortcut which induces a purchaser to select what he 
wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by 
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial 
symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same - to convey through the mark, in the minds of 
potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the 
trademark owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the sym-
bol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress”). 
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By 1942, the Courts of Appeals finally learned to apply the Supreme Court policy. In 
Benton Announcements, Inc.39 the FTC ordered the petitioner, Benton, to cease using the 
word “engraved” to describe its stationery. On appeal, the court found that the process 
used by Benton was much cheaper than ordinary engraving and that few people other 
than experts in the craft could distinguish between engraving and the petitioner’s station-
ery. Nevertheless, the court held that “people like to get what they think they are getting, 
and courts have steadfastly refused in this class of cases to demand justification for their 
preferences. Shoddy and petty motives may control those preferences; but if the buyers 
wish to be snobs, the law will protect them in their snobbery.”40 Similarly, in Kerran v. 
FTC41 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order requiring 
sellers of recycled oil collected at gasoline stations to stop marketing it without disclosing 
that it was refined from previously used oil. Despite the finding that re-refined oil is abso-
lutely identical to oil that is refined directly from virgin crude oil both in chemical struc-
ture and quality, the court held that because consumers prefer new to used oil (why?), the 
sellers’ practice misled consumers. “The public is entitled to know the facts . . . and then 
make its own choice . . . even though the choice is predicated at least in part upon ill-
founded sentiment, belief, or caprice.”42  
 
Why consumers should be protected in their “irrational” beliefs the court did not say. 
Nor did it find that consumers would be better off if protected in their snobbery. The op-
posite is true. Courts have emphasized that persuasive branding fosters the differentiation 
of physically identical products by creating a whimsical aura that enables producers to 
command higher prices than they would have been able to command had they faced the 
full burden of competition.43 Consumers are, on its face, worse off because they pay more 
for the same identical product they could have purchased for much less. If instead of pro-
tecting consumers’ “irrational beliefs” the court would impose on them the same item,44 
                                                     
39 Benton Announcements, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 130 F.2d 254 (2d Cir., 1942). 
40 Id at p. 255. 
41 Kerran v. Federal Trade Commission, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir., 1959). 
42 See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,380 U. S. 374, 389 (1965) (“We find an especially strong simi-
larity between the present case and those cases in which a seller induces the public to purchase an arguably 
good product by misrepresenting his line of business, by concealing the fact that the product is reprocessed, 
or by misappropriating another’s trademark. In each the seller has used a misrepresentation to break 
down what he regards to be an annoying or irrational habit of the buying public -- the preference for 
particular manufacturers or known brands regardless of a product's actual qualities, the prejudice 
against reprocessed goods, and the desire for verification of a product claim. In each case the seller rea-
sons that when the habit is broken the buyer will be satisfied with the performance of the product he 
receives. Yet, a misrepresentation has been used to break the habit and, as was stated in Algoma Lum-
ber, a misrepresentation for such an end is not permitted”[emphasis added]). 
43 See for example Algoma Lumber Co. v. FTC, 64 F. 2d 618 (9th Cir., 1933); Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d at 
567 (“The primary value of the modern trademark lies in the conditioned reflex developed in the buyer by 
imaginative or often purely monotonous selling of the mark itself. To the extent that advertising of this type 
succeeds, it is suggested, the trademark is endowed with sales appeal independent of the quality or price of 
the product to which it is attached; economically irrational elements are introduced into consumer choices; 
and the trademark owner is insulated from the normal pressures of price and quality competition. In con-
sequence the competitive system fails to perform its function of allocating available resources efficiently. 
Moreover, the economically irrelevant appeal of highly publicized trademarks is thought to constitute a 
barrier to the entry… In some markets this barrier to entry may be insuperable”). 
44 For example, by allowing sellers to use certain misdescriptive terms in their trade-name (e.g., “Mill” 
for a seller who is not a grinder) or by compelling certain sellers to license the right to use a mark. 
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consumers would be able to purchase the same physical flour, lumber, engravings or gas 
at a lower price.  
 
A different approach was taken by Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.45 Judge Frank agreed with the Supreme Court’s view that Snobbery should be pro-
tected. However, unlike the latter, he explained that the purpose is NOT to protect con-
sumers, but quite the opposite. Judge Frank concluded that the sole purpose of trade-
name law is to protect producers against those who wish to free ride on their goodwill. 
Under his view, although consumers are undoubtedly worse-off, an overall cost-to-
consumers–benefit-to-producers analysis mandates that the latter be given protection: 46 
 
“Such statements [that trade name law is aimed to protect consumers] the judges 
did not verify… They did not stop to ask whether there was any conflict between 
the objective of (a) aiding consumers and (b) that of preventing loss to the busi-
nessman who first used the trade-name. They failed to see that the doctrine of so-
called ‘unfair competition’ is really a doctrine of ‘unfair intrusion on a monop-
oly’. Had they done so, they would squarely have faced the question of the value 
to consumers of such a judge-made monopoly. But reiteration of the consumer-
benefit argument was bound, sooner or later, to evoke doubts such as this: If Alert 
& Co. sells a laundry soap, under the name 'Quick Clean,' at 75 cents a cake, and 
a competitor, Wiseacre, Inc., then begins to sell the identical soap under the same 
name at 50 cents a cake, Alert & Co. loses customers, and therefore money, if it 
maintains its price; but the purchasers are misled to their financial benefit.  If the 
sole purpose were to protect consumers from direct financial loss, the second 
name-user in such a case would have a complete defense if he showed that he 
sold, at a lower price, precisely the same article (compounded of exactly the same 
ingredients) as the first user [emphasis added].”47 
 
Judge Frank’s conclusion was simple: the reason for judicially safeguarding trade-
names is to protect producers so that they can reap what they have sown. This property-
patent rationale, however, is in direct contrast with the long-standing view that the es-
sence of both trademark infringement and unfair competition is to avoid consumer confu-
sion and that “protection of trademark is merely a facet of consumer protection.”48 More-
over, Judge Frank’s explanation fails to explain the cases that gave birth to the Supreme 
Court’s policy of “protecting consumers in their irrational beliefs.” If the major rationale 
is a desire to protect a senior competitor from a junior that free-rides on a senior’s devel-
oped name, it does not explain why the Supreme Court did not allow producers to use 
                                                     
45 See Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir., 1943) and Standard Brands, 
Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir., 1945). 
46 Judge Frank noted that while courts have adopted Adam Smith’s view that the economic well-being of 
consumers is the paramount goal of any economic activity “legal principles do not dwell a la Robinson 
Crusoe or in an anarchic state of nature.” Id at p. 958. He explained that the law often creates immunities 
from competition by creating and enforcing monopolies. Trade-name law, to Judge Frank, is one such type 
of monopoly to protect producers, not consumers. 
47 Id at 40-41. 
48 See McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §2:33 at p. 2-58 (4th ed. 2002)); 
Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M&M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130 (2d Cir., 2003). 
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names that are in the public domain. The words “Milling” in Royal Milling, “White Pine” 
in Algoma Lumber and “Engraved” in Benton were all generic names—permanent resi-
dents of the public domain. Had the Supreme Court allowed sellers of flour to use the 
word “Milling” in their trade name, or sellers of lumbers to use the generic name “White 
Pine,” no competitor would have suffered a diminution in his investment. Their marks 
would serve their traditional function: identifying their source of manufacture.49 Con-
sumers, on the other hand, would have enjoyed a decrease in price and an increase in wel-
fare. 
 
IV. RE-EVALUATING THE ROLE OF PERSUASIVE BRANDING 
 
A. Looking beyond the Tangible Product 
 
This part offers a new economic rationale for protecting Snobs. It challenges the insti-
tutions’ approach that consumers are irrational and it argues that Snobbery is a desirable 
welfare-enhancing phenomenon which inures to the benefit of both consumers and pro-
ducers. It does so by offering a more complex view of the role of trademarks. Prior for-
mulations of the economic role of trademarks assumed that their role is simply limited to 
conveying information about the physical product to which they are affixed, thereby re-
ducing consumers’ search costs. 50 Trademarks serve this role by signifying a specific 
source of manufacture (or sale). Because they denote a constant source, the consumer 
who wishes to purchase a product she bought in the past does not need to conduct a 
costly search; she need not investigate the substitutes available in the marketplace or re-
member details regarding the product’s materials, composition, etc. The mark or the 
trade-name tells her: “I am the one you want.” They also provide her with the assurance 
that the product’s physical attributes are the same as the physical attributes of her previ-
ous purchase (because it is manufactured by the same source). 
 
Viewing trademarks only as a means of communicating information about the prod-
uct to which they are attached, albeit a viable thesis, is somewhat naïve. Trademarks may, 
because of the mark’s popularity, become an important attribute of the product itself, just 
like a color, taste, smell or design. Often, a trademark may even become the product it-
self. To illustrate, think of the insignia used by the Mercedes-Benz corporation to identify 
its cars. Over time, the insignia may gain value of its own so that consumers will be will-
ing to don the Mercedes emblem as earrings, key-holders, etc. Such use is a non-
trademark use. The mark becomes a good of its own. In its new incarnation, the mark is 
emancipated from the physical product to which it previously had been subordinated, fi-
nally free from the product it once designated.51 This new type of earrings (Mercedes 
                                                     
49 Royal Mill, for example, would denote a different source of sale from X-Mill or Y-Milling. 
50 For a thorough analysis of the role of trademark see W. Landes and R. Posner, The Economic Structure 
of Intellectual Property Law (2003), at p.166 and Shahar J. Dilbary, The Role of Trademarks in Intra Brand 
Settings (unpublished manufacture, 2006). See also infra note 157. 
51 Of course, one can think of situations where there exists a complementary relation between the new 
product, (the emancipated mark) and the original goods to which that mark was (and may still be) affixed 
to. For example, if Mercedes Benz Co. would become associated with low quality cars it may affect the 
demand for “Mercedes earrings”. In such a case the earrings and Mercedes may be analyzed as comple-
mentary goods. 
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shaped) may be manufactured by different tradesmen, each of which may use a trademark 
to identify itself as a source. Trademark law is not indifferent to the possibility that a 
mark may gain such intrinsic value that its “trademark function” may become shaded or 
even altogether eliminated. The law holds that where a mark is divested of its “trademark 
value” it is “functional” (or “aesthetically functional”) and denies it protection. In the 
case of International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg,52 for example, the defen-
dant sold jewelry and related items bearing the insignias of the Job’s Daughters, which 
were protected as “collective marks”.53 Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant’s 
use of the Job’s Daughters name and emblem was not actionable since they were simply 
functional aesthetic components of the jewelry. The insignias were copied and sold “on 
the basis of their intrinsic value, not as a designation of origin or sponsorship.” 
 
But in between the two types of extreme cases—those in which a trademark has a 
purely informational role (signifying a source of manufacture or sale) and those in which 
it becomes reincarnated as a product in its own right (e.g., the Mercedes earrings)—lie 
cases of a third type. In this last type, a trademark retains its functional source but also 
serves as an independent good. Not only does the mark increase consumers’ welfare by 
decreasing their informational costs but also it provides them with additional utility in-
dependent of its parent product. At least one court, however, was not willing to extend 
protection in these cases. In Pagliero v. Wallace China, the court engaged in a demand-
based analysis.54 The Pagliero test asks whether the mark enhances demand for the 
physical product. If it does, then the mark is considered “functional” and as a result is not 
protected. If, on the other hand, the mark’s impact is limited to imparting information 
about the goods to which it is affixed, then it is eligible for protection. The test is in the 
lines of Professor Brown’s proposal to disaggregate the informational “threads” of adver-
tising from the persuasive ones. 
 
This Article rejects the view that imitation should be forbidden only where the 
mark is “adopted for purposes of identification . . . and hence, unrelated to basic con-
sumer demands in connection with the product.” The Pagliero court’s reliance on a de-
mand test is misplaced. It may well be that a mark, while keeping its “trademark func-
tion” as identifier, may nevertheless enhance consumers’ demand.55  Indeed, it is often 
                                                     
52 International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg, 633 F.2d 912 (1980). 
53 A collective mark is a trademark “used by the members of a cooperative, an association or other col-
lective group or organization… and includes marks used to indicate membership in a union, an association 
or other organization. 15 USCS § 1127. See also Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of 
America, 920 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1990) and McCarthy, supra note 48, at §19:34. 
54 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). Pagliero’s so called “aesthetic function-
ality test”, under which trademark protection is barred from a design whose aesthetic appeal is “an impor-
tant ingredient in the commercial success of the product”, was limited (albeit not explicitly rejected) by 
subsequent decisions. See for example Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 772 
(9th Cir. 1981); McCarthy, supra note 48, at §7:80.  
55 Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343. The reliance on a demand-based test is misplaced for two additional reasons. 
First, even where the sole function of a mark is to impart information, it impacts the consumer’s demand 
(see Part V). Second, it seems that the doctrine of functionality calls for a supply-based analysis as it is 
often equated with an increase of producers’ marginal costs (See for example Judge Posner in W. T. Rogers 
Company v. Wendell Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (1985) holding that “a functional feature is one which 
competitors would have to spend money not to copy but to design around, as they would have to do if they 
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the case that an individual would buy a product not only because of the product’s physi-
cal attributes but also because of the insignia or the trade-name that identifies the manu-
facturer of the goods. This combined purpose of the trademark may explain why indi-
viduals’ willingness to pay for goods that bear famous marks or trade-names such as 
“Armani” is much higher than their willingness to pay for goods of identical (or even of 
higher) quality and grade. The trade-name “Armani,” for example, has an independent 
value. It informs the public of the owner’s refined taste, status and income. It conveys an 
“image” or a “look” that is annexed to the physical garment. Similarly, individuals are 
willing to pay the “exorbitant prices” demanded by car manufactures such as Ferrari or 
Lamborghini not only because of the cars’ unique physical properties but also because of 
the “popularity” of these cars. A Ferrari, unlike an identical vehicle that lacks the Ferrari 
mark, is able to function as a car while simultaneously signaling the owner’s wealth, lux-
ury and hedonism.  
 
Note that I do not use the word “signal” in its usual sense. The signaling function of 
persuasive advertising is not limited to educating consumers about the properties of the 
tangible product. Rather, it educates others about the product’s owner: the consumer’s 
taste, beliefs and stature. Moreover, trademarks and persuasive advertising sometimes do 
not serve any signaling purpose at all. Instead, they are limited to providing a psychologi-
cal pleasure or private satisfaction. Indeed, consumers are often willing to pay high prices 
for inconspicuous goods such as Calvin Klein underwear or a L’Oreal body lotion, nei-
ther of which is visible to others. They do so because the inconspicuous product creates a 
pleasant feeling. To use the slogan coined by L’Oreal in its recent advertisement cam-
paign, they buy L’Oreal “because [they’re] worth it.” Similarly, the same product can be 
both a signal of status and a source of satisfaction. Hanging a Picasso in the living room 
can be a signal of status for the social person, but what value does it have for the loner 
who only enjoys the fact of owning such a piece of art if not a private emotional cathar-
sis?! 
 
More specifically, there are three inseparable demands within a branded product. The 
first is a demand for the product itself: the physical and functional attributes of a suit, a 
perfume, a salad dressing. The consumer derives a mundane utility from the suit that pro-
tects her from the cold, the scent of the perfume and the taste and nutritional value of the 
salad dressing. The second kind of demand is for intra-brand information56 about the 
product’s credence qualities.57 Was the suit handmade, and is it made from cashmere or 
wool?58 Was the perfume produced according to a “secret formula”?59 How many calo-
                                                                                                                                                             
wanted to come up with a non-oval substitute for a football” [emphasis added]). Another words, Judge 
Posner’s rationale is that protecting a functional feature will raise rivals’ costs which in turn would impact 
supply rather than consumers’ demand. 
56 On the distinction between inter-brand and intra-brand activities see also infra note 157. 
57 Credence qualities are qualities which can not be verified even post-purchased, such as the effects of 
vitamins. The economic literature distinguishes between three types of attributes. Experience qualities 
which can be verified pre-purchase (the color of a tomato), experience quality which can be verified post-
purchase (the taste of canned tuna) and credence qualities. See Darby and Karni, Free Competition and the 
Optimal Amount of Fraud, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 16., No. 1, p. 67-88 (1973). Nelson (1970), 
supra note 26. 
58 See for example Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S. 608 (U.S., 1946); Elliot 
Knitwear, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission., 266 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir., 1959). 
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ries does the salad dressing have per unit?60 Is it low in carbs? Is the product reliable and 
likely to perform well in future periods? As shown in Part V below, the information con-
veyed by the mark leads to the optimal level of consumption of the physical goods and 
thus increases consumers’ surplus. The third demand is for the image or psychological 
pleasure associated with the mark’s fame. The consumer enjoys a new product: the in-
tangible aura which surrounds the physical good: that of being wealthy and affluent, 
spontaneous, “cool” or cosmopolitan. In other words, the trademark does not act to in-
crease sales only by economizing on consumers’ search costs or by minimizing consum-
ers’ error costs. Rather, it also influences directly the demand for the product itself and 
increases sales (formally, this is illustrated by a shift of the demand curve north-east). In 
terms reminiscent of the Pagliero court, this Article argues that although the mark and 
the product are “related to basic consumer’s demand in connection with the product,” the 
mark should nevertheless be protected. And it often is, as shall be demonstrated. 
 
The three demands are commingled. While it is intuitive that consumers seek a 
“package” containing both the product and the pertinent information regarding that prod-
uct’s credence qualities, it is less obvious why a consumer might be interested in tying 
her demand for an image or a psychological freight to a physical product. The answer is 
simple. Social norms and technological constraints often make it impossible to consume 
the intangible asset apart from a physical one. Indeed, one cannot enter the local super-
market and ask for five units of “prestige,” “status” or “pleasure.” There are very few ex-
ceptions to this observation.61 One such exception is that of noble titles. Unlike feudal 
times when titles conferred upon their bearers substantial rights (such as voting rights, 
rights to land, tax revenues etc), titles today are mainly a matter of status. Sellers of titles 
promise their clients “instant credibility and personal prestige”62—that they will be 
“treated like some sort of Royalty or famous film star.”63 Many websites offer for sale 
titles such as Sir, Lord, Baron, Count, Viscount, Marquis and Duke.64 For the small 
                                                                                                                                                             
59 See for example Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Fred Muelhens, Inc., 38 F.2d 287, 293 (D.N.Y., 1929). 
60 See empirical study conducted by Allan Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure laws on Prod-
uct Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, Journal of law and Economics, Vol. 43, No 2 (Oct, 
2000), 651-677. For an analysis of the survey in intra-brand context see Dilbary (2006), supra note 50. 
61 See for example Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, With Par-
ticular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1069 (1999) (noting that “Status’ has been a 
concern primarily of sociologists, anthropologists, and historians rather than of economists; and though 
there is a growing economic literature, status is still widely considered a noneconomic phenomenon, be-
cause it cannot be purchased or traded… Although one can invest in activities that will raise one’s status, 
for example by publicly donating to charity, or indeed just by flaunting one’s wealth, one cannot buy status 
directly, as one can the usual good or service.” (emphasis added)). 
62 http://www.englishtitles.co.uk/. 
63 http://www.matthewhenson.com/sorebritishlosers/sorebrits8.htm. Another seller promises that “by ac-
quiring and using a Seated Title [customers] will undoubtedly be treated very differently by the people with 
whom you come into contact with in all aspects of social and commercial interaction. [They] may expect 
the best table at a restaurant, the best seats at the theatre and aboard ship - dinner at the Captain's Table. 
Imagine the difference in the attitude of hotel staff when you check in, not as Mr and Mrs but as Lord and 
Lady. Likewise in the business world - where [the] Title will give [their owners] instant credibility and per-
sonal prestige” (see http://www.english-titles.co.uk/.). 
64 See for example: http://www.elite-titles.com/, http://www.englishtitles.co.uk/, 
http://www.matthewhenson.com/sorebritishlosers/sorebrits8.htm, http://www.english-titles.co.uk/, 
http://www.freebooter.com/titles-of-nobility.asp, http://www.elitetitles.net/main/index.htm,  
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amount of $325 one may even become a Prince, an Emperor or a Sultan. The envied no-
bility status can be achieved in as little time as fourteen days, and its holder can change 
her driver’s license, passport, credit cards and bank accounts to reflect her new status. 
Even Seated Titles—that is, titles that are accompanied by the name of a locality (e.g., 
“The Lord of Hyde Park”) and that are said to be far more prestigious—are valued pri-
marily for their signaling function. The owner of a Seated Title actually buys a parcel of 
land in addition to the title itself. Yet, as the title sellers note, “it is the titles themselves 
that are of significance here with the land itself being of no great importance per se it be-
ing but a token area” (the size of the land is usually no more than one square foot).65  
 
As noted above, social norms are another independent reason that a physical prod-
uct must serve as a platform for the intangible psychological freight.66 Take, for example, 
the person who wishes to inform the public that she is wealthy. One strategy would be to 
do so explicitly. But she will suffer the stigma of being presumptuous, rude or arrogant. 
Moreover, the signal would not be credible. If one could enjoy the social benefits associ-
ated with wealth, prestige or refined taste simply by praising oneself, many would do so. 
Consequently, a pooling equilibrium would occur, and the public would not be able to 
distinguish those who tell the truth from those who do not. The wealthy consumer (the 
Snob) can achieve the desired effect, however, by wearing a conspicuous garment that 
transmits the same message. Burberry’s famous trade dress or a Cartier watch would cer-
tainly do the job. Being visible to the public, such garments function not only as time-
keepers or attires but they also provide information about their owner. The same message 
that would be taken as rudeness if conveyed explicitly becomes style when conveyed in-
directly. The signal is also credible because only those who are wealthy enough are able 
to afford to purchase such products. Even in the case of inconspicuous goods, the psycho-
logical freight of which is merely a pleasant feeling received from wearing a garment or 
an invisible cosmetic ointment, the consumer has to buy the branded product. If she buys 
a physically identical product with an unknown brand, she will not be able to enjoy the 
same level of satisfaction. 
 
Similarly, a work of art may have the same signaling or pleasuring effect. For this 
very reason, consumers purchase both replicas and the original paintings. The former pro-
vides a décor. The latter both provides a décor and creates the image of high socio-
economic status.67 The different psychological freight carried by a physically identical 
object can also explain why the price of a painting attributed to a famous painter plum-
mets dramatically when it is discovered to be a forgery. Those who were willing to pay 
the high premium for the image of snobbery created by a genuine Picasso would not be 
willing to pay the same amount for the very same physical painting if it were attributed to 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.regaltitles.com/, http://www.englishmanor.co.uk/, http://www.baronytitles.com/. For a critical 
view of the title market see http://www.burkes-peerage.net/sites/common/sitepages/ft01.asp,  
http://www.faketitles.com/.  
65 http://www.englishtitles.co.uk/. 
66 It is often the case that the physical platform is necessary for the consumption of the psychological 
product. Watching a horror movie, visiting an amusement park or even consuming drugs are only few ways 
to produce an emotional thrill. As long as the current technology and cultural norms cannot make us buy an 
“emotion” in a pure form, separately from a physical product, such a commingling is a necessity. 
67 See for example W. D. Grampp, Pricing the Priceless: Art, Artists and Economics (1989) at p. 36. 
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an unknown painter.68 That consumption of intangible psychic goods is not limited to ir-
rational individuals is demonstrated by the fact that even Museums often call attention to 
the money-value of their artworks. They do so either explicitly or by calling attention to a 
picture by the way it is exhibited.69 Grampp notes that one such method is to loop a vel-
vet cord in front of a prized acquisition, as the Metropolitan did in 1961 when it hung 
Rembrandt’s Aristotle Contemplating A Bust of Homer, which was acquired at a record 
price of $2.3 million. Another method is to post a guard nearby even when her presence 
is not necessary for the piece’s protection.70 A more intriguing example is that of vintage 
photos. While the original and a copy made from the same negative are identical in all 
physical aspects (indeed, usually the copy made from the same negative is of better qual-
ity than the original which suffers from wear and tear) the price of the original can be sig-
nificantly higher. Professors Landes and Posner report that the “Migrant Mother”—
Dorothea Lange’s widely reproduced 1930’s vintage photograph—was sold at Sotheby’s 
on October 7, 1988 for $244,500. An exhibition quality print could have been obtained at 
$50 from the Library of Congress Photo-duplication Service. This Article argues that 
consumers are willing to pay more for what they could purchase for less, not because 
they are irrational (or for want of information) but because they purchase more than a 
photo. It is only the beholder who is “blind” to the intangible freight. 
 
There are other possible explanations, however, that may account for the consumers’ 
willingness to pay. I will focus briefly on two. The first explanation is one of supply and 
demand. Because the supply of the original piece of art or photo is very limited (often to 
only one unit as in the case of a vintage photo) whereas the supply for copies is very high 
(copies of a photo can be reproduced at a very low marginal cost) it is only natural, the 
argument goes, that the price for the original is higher. The second alternative explana-
tion is one of investment: consumers are willing to pay more for the original not because 
they extract an added value (prestige or satisfaction) but rather because they know that 
they can sell it to others at the same or even higher price in the future. Both arguments 
are unsatisfactory. The first argument assumes that the market for the original and the 
market for its copies are different product markets. But it does not explain why that 
should be so. After all, the opposite assumption—that the original and its copies are per-
fect substitutes—is more appealing (since the two products are physically identical). This 
Article argues that an original is truly different from a copy because the original carries a 
psychological freight that a copy does not. Similarly, the second explanation—that con-
sumers purchase the original as an investment—is flawed for two main reasons. First, an 
investment in arts is a poor investment because its price is subject to the volatile and 
                                                     
68 Id. Grampp reports that when the Museum of Fine Arts in Dahlem, West Berlin, learned that the por-
trait of The Man With The Golden Helmet was not by Rembrandt as had been thought and the Metropolitan 
in New York reached a similar conclusion with regards to two other paintings said to be by the famous art-
ist (Pilate Washing His Hands and Woman Paring Her Nails), their “money value” decreased. But see Lan-
des and Posner, supra note 50, at 255. I do not believe that the scarcity of the original as oppose to the 
widespread availability of its copies can explain the price differential. After all, the copies and the original 
are often perfect physical substitutes: they are of the same grade and quality (to use the words of the Robin-
son Patman Act) save the intangible property associated with the original. 
69 Robert Hughes, Harold Rosenberg Memorial Lecture at the University of Chicago (reported in John 
Walker, National Gallery of Art, rev. ed. (New York, 1984) p. 440, 544 and Grampp, supra note 67, at  25. 
70 Grampp supra note 67, at 25. 
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ever-changing trends of fashions and fads. It is also a unique product which can not be 
easily sold. Other markets are more apt for investing purposes. They offer the same ex-
pected rate of return at a much lower risk. The main flaw, however, lies in the statement 
that one purchases a piece of art as an investment only because others are willing to pay 
more for it. This statement begs the question: why others are willing to do so? The an-
swer provided by this Article is that there is a substantial number of consumers that are 
willing to pay a high premium for the intangible value which piggybacks on the original 
to sustain such a market. 
 
Off-the-counter generic and branded drugs which are identical in chemical structure 
are another example. Assuming equal therapeutic value and drug quality71 and although 
monitored by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), many consumers nevertheless 
prefer to pay a higher price for the branded drugs. Surveys show that buying generic 
drugs could save consumers hundred of million of dollars every year.72 Why pay more 
when one can pay less for the same drug? For the hard-liners, this would be a clear proof 
of the wasteful nature of branding and an evidence of consumers’ irrational behavior. 
Soft-liners would attack the assumption of therapeutic equivalence. They will argue that 
branded drugs convey the information that the physical product the mark is affixed to is 
of better quality and hence commands a higher price. But even they would have to admit 
that if the assumption of therapeutic equivalence holds (i.e., generic and branded drugs 
are indeed of the same physical quality) advertising is wasteful. Even under the weaker 
assumption that generic and branded drugs are not absolutely identical, one would expect 
the advertising outlays to reach a maximum level where it is able to convey the informa-
tion that the product it goads is a “winner”. Advertising expenditures, however, seem to 
be much higher than necessary to achieve this informational goal.73 This article’s expla-
nation, on the other hand, is that consumers of branded drugs are rational. They buy not 
only a drug; they also buy a feeling. They purchase Bayer’s Aspirin for the same reason 
they purchase L’Oreal lipstick: because they “worth it”. They receive their peace of mind 
not only by taking the pain reliever but also from knowing it was made by Bayer. More-
over, many times a placebo (a tablet that contains no medication) has medical effects due 
to purely psychological reasons. An advertisement that constantly harps that a drug 
manufactured by a certain brand will make you stronger, healthier or more active sexu-
ally, may well have a better impact than a physically identical drug bearing a different 
mark, or no mark at all. I now turn to analyze the impact of the model on two distinct 
bodies of laws: Trademark anti-dilution and price discrimination.  
                                                     
71 See William O. Bearden and J. Barry Mason, Determinants of Physician and Pharmacist Support of 
Generic Drugs, The Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 7 No. 2 (1980) p. 121-130. The authors argue that 
there may be real differences between generic drugs and their brand name equivalents. They note that 
chemical equivalency does not necessarily promise therapeutic equivalency because of factors such as 
“varying packing density, crystalline form of active ingredients, and biological text of inactive fillers and 
binders”. Also, some surveys have suggested that the FDA is less efficient in monitoring small firms, which 
are the ones most likely to produce drugs (see Fisher David, Genetic Chaos, Hospital Practice Vol. 13, p. 
13-18). 
72 Bearden and Mason, supra note 95, cite the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) re-
port which notes that the use of generic drugs could easily save consumers in excess of $400 millions an-
nually and particularly benefit the elderly. 
73 See for example Hurwitz and Caves, supra note 14, reporting that in the drug industry where R&D ex-
penditure are relatively high, promotion budget can be twice to four times larger than the R&D budget. 
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B. Anti-Dilution 
 
(i). Trademark Infringement and Dilution 
 
Trademark dilution is not only a newcomer to the federal arena,74 it is also an excep-
tion to the general rule. The gist of trademark analysis is the finding of consumers’ con-
fusion. Traditional trademark infringement occurs when one producer palms off his prod-
uct as another’s. The law protects the public so that it will be confident that in purchasing 
a product bearing a particular trademark it will get the product which it asks for; it pro-
tects the producer from a diversion of trade on non-meritorious grounds.75 Although 
trademark law is designed to protect both consumers and producers, the private cause of 
action is only available to competitors. The law allows those “parties with the greatest 
interest in enforcement, and in many situations with the greatest resources to devote to a 
lawsuit, to enforce the statute rigorously”76 and be the avengers of the public.77 
 
Trademark dilution, on the other hand, has been the subject of a constant controversy 
since its introduction to American Jurisprudence in 1927 by Professor Schechter.78 
“Dauntingly elusive”,79 “amorphous concept”80 and “a theory that no one understands”81 
are just few of the epithets used to describe it. Generally speaking, dilution may wear two 
forms: blurring and tarnishment.82 Blurring is the whittling away of a trademark’s 
uniqueness. It occurs when other sellers, not necessarily of identical goods, use or modify 
                                                     
74 Enacted by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (effective Jan. 16, 1996) (codified as amended 
at, 15 U.S.C. 1125(c), 1127) (“FTDA”). 
75 The Senate Committee on Patents, S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1946), U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1274 (stating that “[t]he purpose underlying any trademark statute is twofold. One is to protect the public 
so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably 
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark 
has spent energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment 
from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-established rule of law protecting both the 
public and the trademark owner” (emphasis added)); See also General Baking Co. v. Groman, 3 F.2d 891 
(C.C.A 1st Cit. 1925). 
76 Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1987). 
77 General Baking Co. v. Groman, 3 F.2d 891 (C.C.A 1st Cit. 1925). 
78 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harvard Law Review 813, 22 TM 
Bull 139 (1927), reprinted at 60 TMR 334 (1970). 
79 Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combines Show Inc., v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F. 3d 449, 
451 (4th Cit., 1999). 
80 American Express Co., v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y., 
1989). 
81 Moskin, supra note 11, at 125. 
82 There is a dispute whether under the FTDA tarnishment can give rise to a dilution cause of action.. See 
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F. 3d 497 (2nd Cir., 1996); Toys “R” Us., Inc., v. Mohamad 
Ahmad Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1836 (N.D.C., 1996); Mattel Inc. v. Jcom Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1467 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Clark v. America Online Inc., 2000 WL 33535712 (C.D.Cal.); Mattel Inc., v. Internet 
Dimensions Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1620 (S.D.N.Y., 2000); New York Stock Exchange Inc. v. new 
York New York Hotel, LLC., 60 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D.S.D.C. 1999). But see: Klieger, supra note 23, at 830. 
Even the skepticism evinced more recently by the Supreme Court in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 
537 U.S. 418 (2003) does not seem to ban the popular cause of action from the dilution hall-of-fame (Cat-
erpillar Inc. v. The Walt Disney Company, 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (D.C.C.I., 2003); Starbucks Corp. v. 
Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19239 (D.C.S.D. 2004). 
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the plaintiff’s trademark to identify their own goods.83 Using the famous mark “Rolls-
Royce” for computers or “Tiffany” for shoes are few examples. In these cases there is no 
concern that the public will be confused. There is no passing off (consumer are not likely 
to think the renowned car manufacturer is affiliated with the sale of the computer) nor is 
there a threat that the use of the mark by the computer manufacturer would divert trade 
away from Rolls-Royce. Rather, such a use will lessen the power of the mark to identify a 
unique seller (the words “Rolls-Royce” would trigger an association of a car and a com-
puter). The second form of dilution, tarnishment, occurs when the plaintiff's trademark is 
linked to products of shoddy quality or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory con-
text that is likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product. It replaces a 
positive association by a negative one. Tarnishment claims typically arises in cases where 
a mark is depicted in a context of sexual84 or illegal activity85 or where the defendant 
pokes fun at another’s mark.86 For example, in Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-
Busch the court enjoined the seller of a floor wax containing insecticide from using the 
slogan “Where there’s life there’s Bugs”—a close version of which the plaintiff used in 
marketing its Budweiser beer (“Where there’s life there’s Bud”)—finding such use to be 
tarnishing.87 
 
(ii). Anti-Dilution Law Protects the Persuasive Value of Famous Trademarks 
 
Anti-dilution theory undeniably protects the very function of branding that has elic-
ited hostile reactions from both economists and jurists: that of persuasiveness. Professor 
Brown notes that dilution is “the clear most candid and far reaching claim on behalf of 
persuasive values” and concludes that as such it should be divorced from the protection 
of the law.88 Similarly, in Augusta National the court analogized dilution to “a cancer 
which, if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the [persuasive] advertising value of 
the mark” causing the erosion of its “magic”.89 Another commentator concluded that anti-
dilution laws preserve the “non-rational associations the shovel maker had succeeded in 
building up”.90 More recently, in a critical article Professor Welkowitz warns that dilution 
“can create artificial barriers to entry into the marketplace by fostering brand loyalty at 
                                                     
83 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F. 3d 497 (2nd Cir., 1996) (“Dilution by blurring occurs 
when customers or prospective customers see the plaintiff's mark used on a plethora of different goods and 
services”). 
84 The Pillsbury Company v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D.G., 1981) (de-
fendant published in “Screw” magazine a picture featuring figures resembling the plaintiff's trade charac-
ters engaged in sexual intercourse). 
85 The Coca-Cola Company v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183(1972) (enjoining the sale of post-
ers reading “enjoy cocaine” that consisted of the soft drink manufacturer’s “Coca-Cola” mark). 
86 See for example American Express Co., v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 
2006 (S.D.N.Y., 1989); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir., 1994). 
87 Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433(5th Cir., 1962). 
88 Id at p. 1191, 1205. 
89 Augusta National, Inc. v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
210 (D.S.D.G., 1976) (“Dilution is an act which threatens two separable but related components of adver-
tising value. Junior uses may blur a mark’s product identification or they may tarnish the affirmative asso-
ciations a mark... convey(s)”). 
90 Comment, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O’-The-Wisp?, 77 Harvard Law Review 520, 54 
TMR 184 (1964) (hereinafter “Comment on Dilution”) at p.522. 
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the expense of thoughtful decision making”.91 Of this critical view is also Klieger. 
Klieger observes that trademarks serve as a vessel through which both forms of advertis-
ing (informative and persuasive) must pass. The latter, he argues, is “aimed at the con-
sumer’s heart rather than mind”. Rather than convey to consumers information regarding 
the “physical elements or attributes”, it seeks to create an intangible aura.92 He con-
cludes that “where product differentiation results from differences in the products’ tangi-
ble characteristics… informed consumers rationally pay the premium. But where product 
differentiation is built primarily on a nonrational or emotional basis, through the efforts 
of the ad-man, consumer willingness to pay the premium proves economically ineffi-
cient”. Following Professor Brown, he suggests disaggregating good from bad, informa-
tive from persuasive. Because he believes that anti-dilution laws only protect the persua-
sive function of trademarks, he urges that they should be abandoned altogether. 
 
(iii). The Rational Basis for Anti-Dilution’s Protection of Famous Marks 
 
Why did Congress provide protection to the very doctrine that only protects the per-
suasive function of branding which courts and commentators deem to be anticompetitive 
and detrimental? To date, no clear explanation exists.93 The prevalent view is that anti-
dilution laws protect only the trademark owner and secure the selling power of a famous 
trademark: its ability to draw future sales.94 Other reasons often mentioned as possible 
justifications are protecting the trademark owner against encroachment on its newly es-
tablished property right in gross;95 the protection of the mark’s owner against the misap-
propriation of his investment in advertising;96 the trespass upon the owner’s property;97 
an “unauthorized taking”;98 the impediment of the trademark’s owner ability to expand 
his trade to other lines or fields of enterprise;99 the protection of the owner against con-
fusing uses;100 the protection of the trademark’s owner from uses that may render his 
                                                     
91 D. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 531, 584 (1991). 
92 As an example, Klieger, supra note 23, cites a survey which found that consumers associate the trade 
dress of a Coca-Cola bottle with feelings such as ultimate enjoyment, uniqueness and universal unity. He 
deplores that although competitors can deliver a similar physical product—one of equal if not a better taste 
than that of Coca-Cola—they cannot match the latter’s associations without wasting resources on persua-
sive advertising. 
93 The elusive nature of the doctrine was recently discussed by Moskin, supra note 11, at 122, who en-
throned it as “a phenomenon that cannot be seen, measured or otherwise perceived or detected” and one 
that “has proven wholly resistant to analysis”. 
94 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir., 1994). 
95 Klieger, supra note 23, at 806. Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433(5th 
Cir., 1962); The Coca-Cola Company v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183(1972); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F. 2d 200 (2nd Cir., 1979); Moskin, supra note 11, at 143. 
96 Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 264 N.Y.S. 459 (1932); Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 
F.2d 348, 357, 76 U.S.P.Q. 374 (9th Cir. 1948); Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 
F.2d 433(5th Cir., 1962); Welkowitz, supra note 91, at 584 (“The real justification for the use of dilution is 
more the protection of marks against misappropriation than against “whittling away.”). But see Ty Inc., v. 
Perryman, 306 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.,2002) (Judge Posner doubts the misappropriation rationale). 
97 Welkowitz, supra note 91, at 534; Moskin, supra note 11, at 132. 
98 Moskin, supra note 11, at 131. 
99 Schechter, supra note 78. 
100 Comment on Dilution, supra note 90, at 523, 531. 
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mark generic;101 protection against the theft of the image and prestige the trademark 
owner has created;102 and protection against cheap copies.103 
 
As opposed to the colossal controversy with regard to the rationales underlying the 
dilution doctrine and its applicability, there exists a universal consensus that the aim of 
anti-dilution law is to protect the owner of the mark rather than consumers,104 and that it 
is a departure from the consumer-protection basis to a “radical business-friendly” re-
gime.105 In its most recent decision, the Supreme Court in Moseley v. V-Secret has noted 
that “unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution… 
are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers”. This article challenges these 
statements. 
 
Christening anti-dilution statutes as creating a sort of an exclusive property right that 
inures only to the benefit of producers has also raised questions as to the constitutionality 
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). The main concern lies in Congress’ au-
thority. Congress can grant an exclusive intellectual property right only under the Patent-
Copyright Clause.106 This clause requires that an exclusive property right be given only to 
original “writings and discoveries” and even then it must be given for a “limited time” 
only.107 Because trademarks are neither,108 in enacting the Trademark Act, Congress had 
to rely on the less powerful Commerce Clause.109 But as Jacob notes,110 in so doing Con-
gress cannot escape the limitations of the Patent-Copyright clause or the requirement of 
the latter would be meaningless. Put differently, a right granted under the Commerce 
clause cannot be exclusive and permanent. Thus, if anti-dilution theory elevates a right in 
                                                     
101 Welkowitz, supra note 91, at 548; Comment on Dilution, supra note 90, at 523, 531; Moskin, supra 
note 11, at 124, 128, 149; Callmann, supra note 25, §22:13 at 22-132, 138, §2:14 at 22-237. But see: Judge 
Posner in Ty Inc., v. Perryman, 306 F.2d 509 (7th Cir., 2002), rejecting the genericism rationale. 
102 American Express Co., v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 2006 (S.D.N.Y., 1989); 
Augusta National, Inc. v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. 210 (D.S.D.G., 
1976). 
103 Landes and Posner, supra note 50, at 209. 
104 Schechter, supra note 78, at 825; Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 827 (2004) (“Dilution protection moves trademark law away from its basic purpose of 
mutual consumer and producer protection, and instead focuses solely on protecting the producer). Landes 
and Posner (2003), supra note 50, at 207. 
105 Klieger, supra note 23, at 806. 
106 The Patent-Copyright Clause provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). The Commerce Clause provides 
that “Congress shall have Power… to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
107 See Welkowitz, supra note 91, at 532. 
108A right in a mark can potentially last forever. Also, the Supreme Court has held that trademarks are not 
original “writing” (The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879)). 
109 See Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in 
the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535, 538-39 (2000) 
(“Congress cannot use a power other than the Intellectual Property Clause—most importantly, its power to 
regulate interstate commerce—to enact exclusive rights inconsistent with the substantive constraints im-
posed by that clause”); H. Latimer & K. Ablin, Stealth Patents: The Unconstitutionality of Protecting 
Product Designs Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 90 Trademark Rep. 489, 512 (2000). 
110 Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on the Consitutional Edge, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 161(2004). 
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a mark to the level of an exclusive property right—as is often argued—it may be found 
unconstitutional.  
 
Another problem which surrounds the nebulous dilution doctrine is the “fame” re-
quirement. Under the FTDA, only “famous” marks can enjoy anti-dilution protection. 
Many have criticized this requirement for being too strict, “troublesome” or one which 
should be eliminated altogether. Its detractors argue that stronger marks are better able to 
withstand diluting effects.111 It is the weaker or newer marks, they argue, which are more 
likely to suffer from imitation of their brands’ name. They therefore conclude that the 
theory should be extended to protect unknown trademarks.  
 
(iv). A New Rational Basis 
 
The analysis pressed in this article, on the other hand, leads to the conclusion that 
anti-dilution laws inure to the benefits of both producers and consumers. These laws do 
not elevate a right in a mark to an exclusive property right in gross, but rather secure the 
traditional role of the trademark owner as the avenger of the public. Thus, the article 
clears the constitutional concerns that have been raised with regard to the doctrine. It also 
explains the fame requirement. More specifically, this article argues that when the con-
sumer purchases a good bearing a famous mark she receives three products: a physical 
one (such as a Ferrari car, a Cartier watch or a L’Oreal body lotion), information about 
the physical product, and an intangible product (an image, emotion or any other type of 
psychological freight). The physical product is under her full control and is subject to the 
regular tear and wear which are the result of the mundane laws of physics. A Ferrari en-
gine would weaken over time, the watch will submit to law of gravity and stop, and the 
lotion will age and need to be replaced. But that is the only hazard the consumer bears. 
Being the sole possession of the consumer, no one can exploit the physical product with-
out her permission.  
 
The intangible product, on the other hand, has no reason to suffer from the same dis-
eases which are unique to tangible assets. Theoretically, it can last as long as the physical 
product to which it is attached exists. Unlike the physical product, however, it is not un-
der the control of the buyer. The buyer receives the right to use or enjoy the intangible 
psychological effect attached to the product (conveyed by the famous mark). But the 
mark can be eroded, or to use the trademark lingo, diluted, if, for example, the public 
learns to associate the mark with an unsavory image. For example, if the public learns to 
associate “Coca-Cola” with drug consumption112 or “Bud” beers with bugs113 then in-
stead of conveying a hedonistic life-style or a sense of freedom or just a pleasing associa-
tion, it will subject the owner of the mark, as well as the consumer who purchased the 
goods, to ridicule or disgust. The focal point is that the contamination of the mark de-
                                                     
111 Moskin, supra note 11, at 142; Welkowitz, supra note 91, at 540 (“If anything, weaker marks are 
more likely to suffer the fate described by Schechter”); Callmann, supra note 25 §22:14 at 22-229; Klieger, 
supra note 23, at 846. 
112 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
113 Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433(5th Cir., 1962). 
Shahar Dilbary: Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs” 
25 
stroys the value to the consumer. Not the product’s physical value: that will remain the 
same. Rather, it destroys the emotional experience and the image that accompanies it. 
 
Contamination or, to use the trademark lingo again, dilution, divests an article from 
its psychological freight (or, even worse, replaces a positive psychological association 
with a negative one) and renders it worthless. The third party that destroys the aura of the 
famous mark inflicts on both the consumers and the producer an externality. He appropri-
ates the positive image or feeling associated with the mark to his own benefit without in-
ternalizing any of the costs of such appropriation. Using the slogan “Never Leave Home 
Without It” in connection with the sale of condoms as a spoof on American Express’ 
“Don’t Leave Home Without It” will destroy the image of decency and respect that the 
credit card company has created114. It will also decrease consumers’ utility from showing 
a prestigious card and result in a decrease in consumption. This is not to say that there are 
no benefits from such an appropriation. For example, using the mark “Rolls Royce” in 
connection with radio tubes can provide consumers with the information that the radio 
tubes are of high quality. But, so long as the language is rich enough, the producer of the 
radio tube has other alternatives to describe his product without inflicting costs on others. 
The producer can also invest resources in coining new words to convey the desired mes-
sage, if he so wishes, and consequently enrich the language. 
 
Note that the analysis, with respect to the consumers’ interests, is backward looking. 
It protects the ex-ante expectations (at the time of purchase) of those who already pur-
chased a good, against the diminution of their intangible property from the hazard of a 
possible externality.115 With regard to producers, on the other hand, anti-dilution law 
serves a forward looking function. It protects the mark’s ability to draw prospective cus-
tomers. This is not to say, however, that the psychological freight of a mark is not subject 
to “wear and tear ”. It is. If the producer does not maintain the magnetism of its trade-
mark—by launching advertising campaigns in connection with the mark or prosecuting 
those who infringe it—the mark will gradually lose its psychological effect. This “wear 
and tear”, however, may take time and is reasonably expected by the consumer. Also, ab-
sent an externality, producers most probably will not be so keen to jeopardize their 
marks’ sales appeal, as it will detract from their ability to attract prospective custom-
                                                     
114 See infra note 134. 
115 Note that the analysis is true for both durable and non-durable (or even perishable) products. In the 
case of durable goods, for example a Ferrari car, anti-dilution law protects the high premium the consumer 
paid for fame and status. The consumer’s expectation is that during the post-purchase period, the car’s 
reputation will be protected from a third party detrimental activity. In the case of non-durable goods, such 
as a Coca-Cola drink, it is true that because of the immediate nature of consumption the product (by defini-
tion) will not endure for a long period of time and hence post-purchase protection is not required. Yet, the 
consumer enjoys the psychological effect which accompanies those who drink Coke (see supra note 92 for 
a survey finding that consumers associate Coca-Cola bottles with feelings such as ultimate enjoyment, 
uniqueness and universal unity). If the young or cool image conveyed by the mark Pepsi is destroyed, the 
consumer will not be willing to pay more than its marginal cost of production. He will also bear the switch-
ing cost associated with adapting to a new product which is able to convey the same signal (assuming such 
a product exists). A short life expectancy would only impact the premium for prestige, it would not elimi-
nate it altogether, and in some occasions it may even increase it (for example, a lavish vacation signals high 
status, because only wealthy people would spend much money for such a non-durable instant ser-
vice/good). 
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ers.116 The analysis offered here sheds some new light on the classification of trademark 
law in the family of intellectual property rights, whose distinguishable members: copy-
right, patent and trade-secret law have always received a preferable treatment as being 
“real” intellectual property. Trademark can also join this “hall of fame” so to speak, by 
protecting the intellectual property of consumers.  
 
Another possible result of the analysis is the expansion of the dilution doctrine. While 
courts usually find tarnishment when a positive association is replaced by a negative one, 
this articles argues, that a better formulation of the test should be one which protects 
against associations which are not consistent with the image created by the producers. A 
Ferrari consumer, for example, would not want the mark of its prestigious car to be af-
fixed to a fast food chain, even if there is a consensus that the chain is the “best” of its 
kind. Such a use will not only blur the mark’s distinctiveness, but it will also create an 
association which it is very likely that Ferrari owners would oppose. 
 
C. Price Discrimination 
 
(i). “Like Grade and Quality” 
 
Charging different prices for the same physical goods bearing different marks may 
be illegal for two reasons. First, it may deceive the public as to the quality of the products 
involved. It has been argued that because the public reasonably assumes that products 
bearing different marks are of different quality; affixing different labels to the same 
product misleads consumers to pay more for what they could have purchased for less.117 
It may also be considered a form of price discrimination.118 Section 2(a) of the Clayton 
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA)119 provides that it is unlawful for a 
seller to either directly or indirectly discriminate in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality where the effect of such discrimination may be 
                                                     
116 In a non-formal survey it was possible to find promises by producers that they will protect the image 
of their product. One example is the following statement given by Mark Weber, the President and Chief 
Operating Officer of Phillips-Van Heusen (FVH), the owner of several high-end brands in the fashion in-
dustry (such as Van Heusen and Calvin Klein): “the strength of our Company is the strength of our 
brands... We value,  protect and build these brands with commitment and action that are unsurpassed” 
[emphasis added]. Available at http://www.pvh.com/BrandsProducts_PresidentsMesg.html. Feb 2005. 
117 Callmann supra note 25, Vol. 1A §5:11 pp. 5-72, 5-73, 5-74 (“it is reasonable to assume that the use 
of different trademarks suggests that the products to which they are attached are different in nature, quality 
or characteristics. It is, therefore, just as deceptive for the same seller to market the identical product under 
different trademarks as it is to sell the same article under different prices without any justification”), Vol. 1, 
§4:54 p.4-587; Consolidated Books v. FTC., 53 F. 2d 942 (1931); FTC v. Berry Seed 2 F.TC. 427 (1920); 
FTC v. St. Louis Lightening 3 FTC 327 (1921).  
118 Callmann supra note 25 Vol. 1, §4:54 p.4-587 and at Vol. 1A §5:55 p. 5-270. Note that registration of 
a valid mark is not a defense against a violation of the antitrust laws, even if the mark has become incon-
testable. See Section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1115. Such a use may also lead to the can-
cellation of the mark. See Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J. A. Buchoroeder & Co. 251 F.  Supp 968 (W.D. 
Mo. 1966); Callmann, supra note 25, Vol. 1, §4:53 at 4-572. 
119 15 U.S.C.S. §13(a). 
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substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly or to injure competi-
tion.120 
 
A threshold inquiry concerning a violation of Section 2(a) is, therefore, whether the 
physically identical commodities bearing different marks are “of like grade and quality”. 
This very question was discussed in FTC v. Borden.121 Borden produced and sold evapo-
rated milk under its own nationally advertised brand and under various private brands 
owned by its retail customers. Although the private label milk was chemically identical to 
the Borden brand, the latter was sold at a substantially higher price. The FTC found the 
milk sold under the Borden and the private labels to be of like grade and quality and the 
price differential discriminatory. The Court of Appeals122 set aside the Commission’s or-
der. It held that the private label milk was not of the same grade and quality as the milk 
sold under the Borden brand because in determining whether products are of like grade 
and quality, consideration should be given to all commercially significant distinctions 
“whether they be physical or promotional”. If customers are willing to pay more for the 
“Borden” name, the court reasoned, that product is of unlike grade.123 In reversing the 
decision the Supreme Court adopted the FTC’s view that physical comparison alone de-
termines whether products are of like grade and quality.124 The Court explained that be-
cause the “like grade and quality” is a threshold requirement essential to the applicability 
of the RPA, if producers are able to differentiate their product by merely affixing differ-
ent labels they would be able to immunize themselves from Section 2 scrutiny. The court 
                                                     
120 Under Section 2(a) the plaintiff must show: 1) a cognizable difference in price; 2) between two buyers 
purchasing contemporaneously from the same seller; 3) involving commodities; 4) of like grade and qual-
ity; 5) that may injure competition (Dyno Nobel, Inc. v. Amotech Corp. 63 F. Supp. 2d. 140, (D.C.P.R., 
1999)). Price discrimination may be defended on the following grounds: (a) to “meet competition”. That is, 
to meet a competitor's offer based on a “good faith” belief that such reduction is necessary to make the sale; 
(b) if there is a “cost justification” (where the lower price resulted from a “due allowance for differences in 
the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from differing methods or quantities”); (c) if the price 
difference results from a “response to changing conditions affecting the market for or marketability of the 
goods” e.g., perishable goods. Some courts also allow the “availability defense” when the seller offered the 
same commodity at different prices, but the lower price was available to all buyers. Callmann supra note 25 
seems to reject the availability defense in the trademark context, noting that the fact “The public may also 
be deceived when a manufacturer chooses a form of dual distribution, selling the same product under one 
trademark at a higher price, and under a different trademark or without trademark at a lesser price… That 
the consumer may not know of the cheaper alternative makes no difference; because, even if he should 
learn about it, his confidence in the trademarked product will deceive him into the belief that it is of better 
quality. To insist that the manufacturer reveal the true facts would lead to the termination of that system of 
dual distribution. The same would occur over the course of time if the dual distribution systems becomes 
widely known”. Id at p. 5-74. 
121 FTC v. Borden Co., 383 US 637 (1966). 
122 Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964). 
123 The Courts of Appeals explicitly held that mere affixation of different labels to physically identical 
products will not suffice. Rather, a showing of a “demonstrable consumer preference” for one brand over 
the other is required to reach a conclusion that the two product are of different grade. Id at p. 137-8. 
124 See also Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 556 (U.S., 1990); DeLong Equip Co v. Washington 
Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F. 2d 1499 (11th Cir., 1989) (“If products are physically identical, despite differ-
ences in labeling or branding, then they are ‘of like grade and quality’ for the purpose of stating a prima 
facie Robinson-Patman Act case, even though consumers may prefer a higher priced ‘premium product’”); 
Areeda, Antitrust Law (Chapter 23, Para. 2315); Callmann, supra note 25, Vol. 1A, §7:29 p. 7.96-7.98; M. 
Briley, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act,  27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 401, 405 (1996). 
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noted, however, that “tangible consumer preferences” as between branded and unbranded 
commodities can receive due legal recognition in the more flexible “injury to competi-
tion” and “cost justification” provisions.125 It therefore remanded the case so that it could 
be ascertained whether the price discrimination resulted in a competitive harm.126  
 
This article challenges the Borden decision. It argues that Borden is inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court’s long standing policy according to which “the public is entitled to get 
what it chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by 
ignorance”, and that “shoddy and petty motives may control those preferences; but if the 
buyers wish to be snobs, the law will protect them in their snobbery”. It is in direct con-
trast with the Supreme Court decisions in Royal Milling and Algoma Lumber, where it 
was held that “if consumers or dealers prefer to purchase a given article because it was 
made by a particular manufacturer [such as Borden] … they have a right to do so and 
this right cannot be satisfied by imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one 
equally as good”.127. It also leads to an anomaly in which one branch of the law, that is 
anti-dilution, recognizes and fosters persuasive advertising; whereas another branch of 
the law, that of price discrimination, ignores the same persuasive value and unreasonably 
impairs the ability of producers to capitalized on their investment.  
 
Moreover, the Borden decision leads to absurd results. For example, under Borden, 
absent a patent, two manufacturers may produce the same product under different brands 
and charge their respective retailers different prices without being subject to the RPA; 
whereas a manufacturer that charges different prices for the same product sold under dif-
ferent labels would be subject to the “flexible” and nebulous “injury to competition” and 
“cost justification” provisions although there is no economic rationale to treat the two 
cases differently. The Borden decision has also a chilling effect. Subjecting manufactur-
ers to the more flexible tests of the RPA deters them, ex-ante, from selling the same 
product under different brands, thus limiting competition in the psychic space.128 
                                                     
125 Id at p. 643-4 and at p. 646. 
126 On remand the Fifth Circuit found that “by increased advertising and promotional efforts over the 
years, Borden has created a decided consumer preference for milk bearing a Borden label”. It found no evi-
dence that “Borden’s price differential exceeds the recognized consumer appeal of the Borden label nor… 
that the prices [were] unreasonably high for Borden brand milk on the one hand, or unrealistically low for 
the private label milk on the other”. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F. 2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967).  See also ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co. 104 F.T.C. 280 (July 25, 1984) (The FTC found that the a price differential ranging from 
25 percent to 38 percent between private label products and national brand did not injure competition on 
the secondary line because it could be explained by consumer preferences and the substantially greater 
costs associated with promoting the national brand). 
127 See also the dissent opinion in Borden by J. Stewart at p. 651-2 (“Commercially the ‘advertised’ 
brands had come in the minds of the public to mean a different grade of milk. The public may have been 
wrong;… it may have been right… But right or wrong, that is what it believed, and its belief  was the im-
portant thing”). 
128 See for example J. C. Bruno, Business Problems and Planning: Negotiating Private Label Agree-
ments, 74 MI Bar Jnl. 1292, 1293 (1995) offering a model ‘Policy Guidelines for Private Labeling’ to be 
adopted by a manufacturer. In section 5, “pricing”, the author suggests that “a Private Label product identi-
cal to the Corporation’s brand product, except that it carries a distributor’s label, should be sold at the same 
price as the Corporation’s brand is sold to the Corporation distributor… a sale to a Private Label distributor 
should be at the same price as a sale to a brand name distributor. No variation from standard pricing should 
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The suggested analysis, on the other hand, mandates the conclusion that a manufac-
turer should be allowed to sell physically identical goods under different marks and 
command different prices without being subject to antitrust inquiry. Competition in this 
model occurs in two dimensions: the physical space and the psychic sphere. It is only the 
total (or full) price of the commingled products which is misleading. The following ex-
ample is illustrative. Consider an economy with two producers where producer A manu-
factures a widget at price PA and a trademark level of TA whereas producer B manufac-
tures the same widget at price PB and a trademark level TB such that TB>TA, PA≠PB. The 
price of each widget can be broken into three components: the price for the tangible 
product itself; the premium charged for the information embedded in the mark with re-
gard to the products’ physical qualities; and the premium charged for the psychological 
load. The two producers are in direct competition in the market for the physical good and 
thus its price will be less than a monopoly price. There is no competition, however, at the 
market of fame (TB>TA). For instance, Cartier and Swatch, to name a few, are brand 
names for watches which (ignoring quality differences) compete at the market for tangi-
ble goods. Cartier, however, sells an “image” of luxury while Swatch sells an “image” of 
being young in spirit and “hip”. Enabling each producer to manufacture the same article 
under different labels and charge different prices will enhance social welfare. It will re-
sult in increase of output of the physical product, and assuming economies of scale, de-
crease marginal costs of production. It will also enable competition in the market of fame 
(Cartier can manufacture the same watch under a brand that will target young spirited 
consumers). This will lead to a reduction in the fame premium (up to the marginal cost of 
branding) and result in a total decrease in price. The result is that a law under which price 
discrimination of same article using different labels is illegal, thrusts upon producers a 
monopoly power and fosters price differentiation (at least at the fame level).129 
 
In Borden, the Supreme Court provided two examples to explain why in its view 
transactions involving physically identical products bearing different labels are “too laden 
with potential discrimination and adverse competitive effect” to be excluded from the 
reach of the RPA. These examples, however, do not support the court’s view. First, the 
Borden court deplored that a “retailer who was permitted to buy and sell only the more 
expensive brand would have no chance to sell to those who always buy the cheaper prod-
uct”. The court failed to recognize that the two products are not substitutes! The branded 
product and the unbranded one constitute two different product markets. Consumers who 
are willing to pay more for the nationally advertised label do not do so because they are 
ignorant or irrational. They are willing to pay more because they receive an added value 
                                                                                                                                                             
be granted without a written analysis as to why the price was charged, e.g., to meet competition or differ-
ences in cost or performance…”. 
129 Another example is a case where a manufacturer enjoys a monopoly in the market for goods, for in-
stance, because of a patent. Because of the Borden decision, the manufacture can market his product only 
under one label. Thus, he will chose an output Q1 and a trademark level T1 which maximize his profits. 
Enabling the monopolist to sell more of the same product under different label with a different trademark 
level T2 (T2≠T1) will unambiguously lead to an increase in output of the same physical product. Assuming 
without limitation that T2<T1, consumers who could not themselves afford the more prestigious widget 
would be able to purchase the same physical product under the less prestigious label. The increase in output 
is also likely to cause an decrease in the marginal cost of production. Enabling the monopolist to price dis-
criminate is therefore a Pareto superior solution. 
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from the famous label. Simply put, consumers of the cheaper brand are not potential con-
sumers of the famous label. Thus, the seller of the branded product is not harmed. Inter-
estingly, the Gillette Court130 has arrived at the opposite conclusion from Borden in dis-
cussing the relevant market for merger analysis.131 In that case, Gillette offered to merge 
with Parker Pen Holdings. The Department of Justice sought to enjoin the merger on the 
ground that it would lessen competition. The court found that the fountain pen market can 
be divided into three sub-markets: “base” pens (less than $50); “premium” pens ($50 to 
$400); and “jewelry” pens ($400 and up). It explained that “premium” pens do not com-
pete with “base” pens because the former “afford their users as well as those who merely 
put them in their breast pockets image, prestige, and status”. It held that because of the 
prestige component, should the price of a premium pen costing, for example, $60, be in-
creased, “consumers will nonetheless purchase the now-costlier pen rather than substitute 
a less expensive, less prestigious model”. In other words, the court concluded that the two 
types of pen are not competing because one type conveyed an image the other didn’t.132  
 
The second example given by the Borden court in support of its decision concerns the 
sale of the same commodity at different prices by two retailer-owned labels: 
 
“If Borden packed for one wholesale customer under two private labels, one hav-
ing more consumer appeal than the other because of the customer’s own advertis-
ing program, Borden must sell both brands at the same price it charges other pri-
vate label customers because all such milk is of the same grade and quality.  At 
the same time, the [wholesaler] buying from Borden under two labels could him-
self sell one label at a reduced price without inquiry under §2(a) because the milk 
in one container is no longer of the same grade and quality as that in the other, al-
though both the milk and the containers came from Borden. Such an approach 
would obviously focus not on consumer preference as determinative of grade and 
quality but on who spent the advertising money that created the preference—
Borden’s customer [the wholesaler], not Borden, created the preference and hence 
the milk is of the same grade and quality in Borden’s hands but not in its cus-
tomer’s. The dissent would exempt the effective advertiser from the Act.  We 
think Congress intended to remit him to his defenses under the Act, including that 
of cost justification.” 
 
                                                     
130 U.S. v. Gillette Company, 828 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C 1993) (finding the relevant product market to be all 
premium writing instruments with suggested retail prices from $40 to $400). 
131 The analysis was made under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §18. 
132 Id at p. 82 (“fountain pens in the $50 to $400 range effectively do not compete with fountain pens ei-
ther below or above that range… In contrast to fountain pens with SRP’s (suggested retail prices) below 
$50, the fountain pens [in the $50 to $400 range] afford their users as well as those who merely put them in 
their breast pockets image, prestige, and status. In accordance with this prestige, manufacturers, retailers, 
and purchasers of the pens recognize that there is a distinction between these pens, which… are priced at 
approximately $50 and up, and those pens which are priced below this threshold. The evidence suggests 
that, should the price of a fountain pen costing, for example, $60 be increased in a non-trivial, non-
transitory fashion, consumers will nonetheless purchase the now-costlier pen rather than substitute a less 
expensive, less prestigious model. In other words, there is a low cross-elasticity of demand between these 
pens and those priced below $50”). 
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This article, on the other hand, suggests that the so-called “effective advertiser” 
should be rewarded. Since it was that “advertiser” who created the added value (that is, 
the psychological load) to consumers, he should be able to sell the physically identical 
product at different prices without being subject to the risk that he may be found liable 
for antitrust violation. Exempting the producer from the risk of the RPA will unambigu-
ously lead to increase in output and total welfare. Indeed, such a regime has been adopted 
in Canada. Section 50(1)(a) of the Canadian Competition Act133 is very similar to Section 
2 of the RPA. It prohibits any seller from discriminating, directly or indirectly, in price 
between different purchasers “of articles of like quality and quantity”. Yet the enforce-
ment agency has taken the view that a trademark or label alone, to the extent they give 
rise to a consumer preference which is reflected in the price consumers are willing to pay 
for an article, is sufficient to distinguish otherwise similar articles. Interestingly, it gave 
an example which is a recast of the facts in Borden, concluding that “In this situation, the 
brand differentiation will generally be sufficient to cause the Director to conclude that 
the articles are not of ‘like quality’”.134 It is suggested here that a similar interpretation be 
adopted with regard to the RPA.135 
 
(ii). “Commodity”, Famous Brands and the Tangibility Requirement 
 
Even if the Borden decision holds, the thesis of this article leads to the conclusion that 
the RPA may not apply at all where products are sold under famous marks because such 
products may not be considered “commodities” for the RPA purposes. Section 2(a) of the 
RPA provides that it is unlawful for a seller to either directly or indirectly discriminate in 
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. Although the 
RPA contains no definition of the term “commodity” courts have interpreted the term to 
                                                     
133 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. 
134 Section 2.5.8.1 of the Director of Investigation and Research, Price Discrimination Enforcement 
Guidelines (1992), reprinted in 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), Spec. Supp. No. 16 (Sept. 17, 
1992) (the “Guidelines”). The Director of Investigation and Research (who is responsible for the admini-
stration and enforcement of the Competition Act) provides two examples in the guideline. The first is a 
recast of the facts in Borden: “assume that a supplier manufactures identical articles sold to retailers under 
a brand name or label of the supplier’s choice, and a brand of the retailer’s choice. Assume further that the 
supplier engages in heavy local and national advertising to promote its own brand, successfully cultivating 
a consumer preference for it, and that the advertising is successful to the extent that both the retailer and 
consumers ordinarily pay a different price for it than they pay for the retailer's private brand. In this situa-
tion, the brand differentiation will generally be sufficient to cause the Director to conclude that the articles 
are not of ‘like quality’”. 
135 Interestingly, during the house hearing it was proposed that §2(a) be amended to read “like grade and 
quality and brand” so that discrimination between different brands would be allowed. Hearing on H.R. 
4995, H.R. 8442 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) at 421). The 
amendment was not adopted. During the debate on the bill Representative Patman was asked about the pri-
vate label issue. His response was that “the bill will protect the [retailers who use private labels]… because 
they will have to sell to the independents at the same price for the same product where they put the same 
quality of merchandise in a package [irrespective of the brand] so long as it is the same quality” (80 Cong. 
Rec. 8115). But see the dissent in Borden holding that “on its face, Mr. Patman's statement makes the blan-
ket assertion that all products of the same quality must be sold at the same price. As thus stated, premium 
brands would have to be sold at the same price as private label brands... These undifferentiated remarks are 
therefore of little assistance in the determination of congressional intent”.) Borden at p. 654. 
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apply only to tangible products.136 Thus, it has been held, for example, that the RPA does 
not apply to the sale of services,137 mutual fund shares138 or licensing agreements.139 The 
distinction between tangible products (which are subject to the RPA) and intangible ones 
(which are not), however, is not always an easy one. This is because a transfer of any in-
tangible is often accompanied by a transfer of tangible assets (recall the analogy to soft-
ware and its physical embodiment). In such cases, in order to determine whether a certain 
transaction falls under the provisions of the RPA courts rely on the “dominant nature of 
the transaction”.140 In Freeman,141 for example, the Seventh Circuit found that the RPA 
does not apply to the sale of a title insurance although the insurer provides the purchaser 
with a physical document, because it is the performance of a service (namely, the search 
of records which might reveal a defect in the title and the rendering of an opinion based 
upon this search) and not the delivery of a physical document (which embodies that ser-
vice) that constitutes the dominant nature of the transaction.142 
 
Because this paper views a product sold under a famous mark as comprised of a tan-
gible and intangible products, one may argue that it may not be considered “a commod-
ity”. This is especially the case where the psychological load is the true product and the 
tangible product is nothing but a platform. In such cases, one may argue that the “domi-
nant nature” of the product is its intangible aura, and therefore its sale should not be sub-
ject to the RPA.143 Under this approach, one can view the sale of a branded good as a 
two-part transaction: a complete sale of a physical product (and information regarding 
that product); and a licensing agreement under which the consumer receives the right to 
use the psychological load attached to the product whereas the producer promises to 
maintain the mark’s fame for the duration of the tangible product (whether by prosecut-
ing infringers or third parties who cause dilution).144 The licensing of intellectual prop-
erty (although in other contexts) has been already recognized by the federal courts as one 
                                                     
136 La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick And Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D.I. 1968); The 
Morning Pioneer Inc. v. The Bismarck Tribune Co., 493 F. 2d 383, 389 (8th Cir. 1974); Advanced Office 
Systems, Inc. v. Accounting Systems Company, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 418 (D.C.S.C. 1977) (“Courts have uni-
formly held that the term ‘commodities’ as used in the Robinson-Patman Act is restricted to products, mer-
chandise, or other tangible goods…”).  
137 The Morning Pioneer Inc. 493 F.2d at p. 389. 
138 Baum v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969). 
139 Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick And Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D.I. 1968). 
140 Tri-State Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United Press International Inc., 369 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1966) 
(“Virtually no transfer of an intangible in the nature of a service, right, or privilege can be accomplished 
without the incidental involvement of tangibles, and we conclude that in such circumstances the dominant 
nature of the transaction must control in determining whether it falls within the provisions of the Act”); the 
“dominant nature” test is not applicable, however, where the two products—the tangible and intangible—
can be sold separately. In such cases only the physical product would be subject to the RPA. See for exam-
ple Metro Communication Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Com. Inc., 984 F. 2d 739 (6th Cir, 1993). 
141 Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F. 2d 527 (7th Cir. 1974). 
142 Kennedy Theater Ticket Serv. v. Ticketron, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that a 
right to a seat in a theater is the dominant nature of the transaction, even though the theater ticket is tangi-
ble). 
143 The dominant nature is not measured by merely breaking down the costs between intangible service 
and tangible goods provided, although it has been held that such a comparison might be useful as one of 
many factors to consider. May Department Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
144 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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which is not subject to the RPA.145 Adopting the interpretation suggested in this part will, 
therefore, be consistent with prior cases. 
 
(iii). A Practical Note 
 
Although the Borden decision and the Supreme Court’s policy have been subject to 
much scholarly attention, RPA cases regarding the sale of branded and unbranded prod-
ucts at different prices are not that common. Several reasons may account for this phe-
nomenon. First, enforcement of the RPA by the agencies has been decreasing dramati-
cally in past years.146 Private litigation has also been reduced due to the strict require-
ments of the RPA and judges’ skepticism with regard to the injurious effects of price dis-
crimination.147 Another reason may be attributed to the “availability theory”. Under this 
judge-made doctrine, if the seller offered different prices for the same commodity to dif-
ferent buyers, but the lower price was available to all, there is no RPA liability. Applying 
the availability theory to the dual branding setting, one may argue that where a manufac-
turer offers its customers both the premium and non-premium brands there can be no 
RPA concern.148 
 
Yet RPA liability should be a valid concern. To start with, private enforcement of the 
RPA, fueled by the prospects of gaining treble damages, is still commonplace. Moreover, 
there is support for the view that the availability doctrine cannot offer a true remedy. In 
order to rely on the “availability theory”, the manufacturer must demonstrate that the 
lower price was practically available to its customers and that the latter were in fact in-
formed of its availability.149 Put differently, to enjoy the availability defense the manufac-
turer must inform its customers that its branded and unbranded products are physically 
identical. But, as Callmann notes, “to insist that the manufacturer reveal the true facts 
                                                     
145 La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick And Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D.I. 1968) hold-
ing that a patent license agreement granting is not covered by the term “commodity”. 
146 The antitrust Division of the DOJ has never used its authority to prosecute under Section 2 of the RPA 
and has been openly critical of the Act. See United States Department of Justice, Report on the Robinson 
Patman Act 149, 169 (1977) (“[T]he Act is made inherently capable of serious harm to society; indeed the 
more the statute is enforced and the more it is complied with, the greater becomes its harmful effects [sic] 
on competition.”). See also: R. Pitofsky H. Goldschmid and D. P. Wood, Trade Regulation (5th Ed., 2003) 
at p. 1290; W. C. Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook (2005 Ed.) Section 4.2 p. 578-9; I. Scher, Antitrust Ad-
visor (4th Ed.) at 9-40; E. W. .Kintner and J. P. Bauer, Federal Antitrust Law (1983), Vol. 3 S30-3 p. 645. 
Similarly, since 1980 the FTC has attempted to enforced the Act only twice. See Pitofsky and Wood at p. 
1290. The authors report that of these two attempts, the first was abandoned and the second was settled. 
147 See Pitofsky and Wood, supra note 146, at 1290. Among these requirements are those pertaining to 
standing and damages. The latter is not an easy one. For example, while liability for price discrimination 
arises when one “may” cause injury to competition, to recover damages the plaintiff has the burden to 
prove actual injury. 
148 Indeed, such an approach was taken by the dissenting opinion in Borden. In a footnote of the dissent 
opinion Judge Stewart noted that “so long as Borden makes private label brands available to all customers 
of its premium milk, it is unlikely that price discrimination within the meaning of §2(a) can be made out”.  
149 Caribe BMW, Inc v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 19 F. 3d 745, 752 (1st Cir., 
1994)(“we do not see how ordinarily one could say that a seller has made favored treatment ‘available’ to a 
disfavored customer if the disfavored customer does not know about the favored treatment” (emphasis in 
original)); DeLong Equip Co v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F. 2d 1499, 1517 (11th Cir., 1989), 
cert denied, 494 US 1081 (1990); Century Hardware Corp v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350, 355-6. 
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(about the physical identity) would lead to the termination of that system of dual distribu-
tion”.150 Thus it seems that the applicability of the doctrine in the trademark context is not 
“practical”. 
 
Furthermore, the scope of the doctrine may be limited so as to provide defense only 
against secondary-line injury (injury to end customers). This is because the conceptual 
basis underlying the doctrine is unclear. It is an unsettled matter whether availability of 
the lower price simply negates a finding of “discrimination in price” or whether it is a 
defense against the substantial “injury” requirement.151 In the first case, if availability de-
nies the finding of a prima facie price discrimination, it would provide the manufacturer-
seller with an absolute immunity. Under this view the dual pricing creates only a price 
differential but not price discrimination. If, however, availability is only a “defense” 
against injury, then it would only bar the disfavored customer (who had the option to buy 
the same commodity at a lower price but chose not to do so) from asserting a secondary-
line injury claim. It arguably may not serve as a defense against injury which results to 
competitors of the manufacturer (first-line injury), who lost sales because of the dual 
pricing.152 Manufacturers who wish to use dual pricing methods are therefore still ex-
posed to antitrust liability. 
 
V. THE MODEL—A FORMAL APPROACH 
 
A. The Basic Model 
 
This section provides a formal description to the intuition discussed below. It con-
structs a formal model which shows that the demand for a branded product is comprised 
of three components: the demand for the physical product itself; the demand for informa-
tion regarding the product’s credence qualities (qualities which can not be verified even 
post-purchase); and the demand for the intangible aura, status or satisfaction that is an-
                                                     
150 Id at p. 5-74. 
151 For authorities holding that the availability of lower price negates the finding of price discrimination 
see Rod Baxter Imports Inc. v. Saab Scandia of America, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 245, 248 n.2 (D. Minn. 1980); 
Pitofsky and Wood supra note 178 at 1285; Holmes supra note 178, at S4.4 p. 628; Scher, supra note 150, 
at 4-64. For authorities raising both bases as possible explanations see: Kintner supra note 146, 19:5; Ira A. 
Millstein, The Status of “Availability” Under Section 2(a) of the Robinson Patman Act, 42 N.Y.L. Rev. 
416, 417-8, 426 (1967); Callmann, supra note 25, S7:33, p. 7-152; DeLong Equipment Co. v. Washington 
Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F. 2d 1499, 1517 (11th Cir. 1989). 
152 Millstein supra note 151, at 427-8; Scher supra note 178 ,at 4-17; Kintner and Bauer, supra note 150 
Vol. 3 at 20:18 p. 136 and 25:7 at p. 455-9; But see Kintner at 25:7 p. 455 noting that “It is arguable that 
any injury which results to competitors of the seller, which lose sales because of the selective price cutting, 
indeed flows from that discrimination regardless of the option which where open to the disfavored buyer; it 
might then follow that primary line actions are no covered by the ‘availability’ defense.. [s]ome courts con-
cluded that this second line analysis is preferable and at least one court has accepted this view and sug-
gested that primary line actions might not be barred by the availability defense. Others accepted that…the 
refusal by a buyer of a reasonable available offer of goods at an equally low price bars all types of price 
discrimination actions. They explain that ‘any injury that competing seller suffer is not the result of the 
price discrimination but rather the result of the lower price offered to, and accepted by, some buyers. If all 
buyers accepted the lower price offered to the competing sellers would have suffered even greater injury’. 
That is, there is absence of the necessary nexus between the lower price to some buyers and the injury to 
the competing sellers”. See Millstein, supra note 151, at p. 445. 
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nexed to the tangible product. The model is related to that of Stigler and Becker (S&B)153 
and Becker and Murphy (B&M).154 Yet it differs in several important aspects. While 
B&M’s model regards the markets for goods and ads as complements that can be pur-
chased separately, the model here regards them as inseparable. It argues that in certain 
circumstances one cannot purchase and consume an advertisement without buying the 
physical product it promotes. More importantly, it does not assume that persuasive adver-
tising “gives favorable notice to other goods.”155 In this respect, it also deviates from the 
signaling models, which argue that the role of advertising is limited to imparting informa-
tion about the physical product that branding endorses.156 Instead, it claims that branding 
creates a new intangible good which must piggyback on the physical one. Moreover, 
S&B conclude that absent asymmetric information branding will not occur.157 Con-
versely, this article explains why branding occurs in a market with incomplete informa-
tion as well as in a perfectly competitive market. The model also differs from the prior 
literature in that it provides a theoretical framework that takes into account both the in-
formational and persuasive value of advertising and marks. 
 
I begin by acknowledging that dilution, persuasive branding and price-discrimination 
are all intra-brand phenomena.158 Thus, to model the impact of persuasive branding I rely 
on a model I developed elsewhere to analyze the role of trademarks and branding in intra-
brand settings.159 The model focuses on products which are characterized by credence 
qualities (qualities that cannot be verified even post-purchase) in a world of asymmetric 
information (the seller is assumed to know his product’s qualities whereas the consumer 
does not). It shows that consumers of such products incur uncertainty costs which cannot 
be eliminated absent trademarks or similar mechanisms. To illustrate, assume that a con-
sumer at the local Starbucks wishes to use a sweetener with her coffee. She can choose 
“Equal”, “Splenda” or “Stevia”—to name few of the most common brands.160 Assume 
                                                     
153 Stigler and Becker, supra note 26. 
154 Becker and Murphy, supra note 10. 
155 Id at p. 941, 945. Becker and Murphy also differ from this paper because they argue that ads “create 
wants” and increase the demand for the physical product. 
156 This approach is mainly attributed to Phillip Nelson. See infra notes 24 and accompanying text. 
157 Stigler and Becker supra note 26, at 84-5. 
158 I use the terms intra-brand and inter-brand to denote two different phenomena. By “inter-brand” activ-
ity I refer to consumers’ decisions which necessarily involve two or more manufacturers. Traditionally, 
trademarks’ roles have been said to be limited to inter-brand settings. They help consumers to identify the 
product they want amongst a set of substitutable products available in the marketplace. Examples of situa-
tions which can be characterized as inter-brand settings are a consumer’s decision whether she should 
choose product manufactured by producer A over product manufactured by B. Similarly, trademark in-
fringement is an inter-brand phenomenon. When producer A palms off his goods as B’s, an inter-brand 
confusion is caused. Conversely, I use the term ‘intra-brand’ to refer to decisions at the manufacturer level. 
For example, once the inter-brand decision has been made (which product should the consumer buy), the 
next question: how many units of that product should she consume calls for an intra-brand analysis. Simi-
larly, when a seller passes-off his own products, not as someone else’s, but rather as possessing attributes 
they do not in fact possess, an intra-brand confusion arises. A producer’s decision to brand the same prod-
uct under different trademarks is also an intra-brand decision. See Dilbary, supra note 51; Dilbary, Trade-
marks As a Media for False Advertising in Intra-Brand Settings (unpublished manuscript, 2006). 
159 Dilbary, supra note 158. 
160 “Splenda” is a no calorie, non-carbohydrate sweetener made of sugar which is suitable for everyone 
including people with diabetes and is made by Johnson and Johnson; “Equal” is a no calorie sweetener 
which contains less than one gram of carbohydrate is aspartame based, and is manufactured by Merisant; 
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further that she has already made her (inter-brand) decision to purchase the sweetener 
Splenda whose taste she likes most (an experience quality). Aware of the health problems 
that are associated with aspartame-based products and increased consumption of calories, 
carbs and the risk of diabetes, she is interested to know these attributes before consump-
tion. If it is a low calorie sweetener or if it is made of an ingredient that makes it suitable 
for people with diabetes, the consumer will be willing to use it generously; if high in 
calories or aspartame-based she will purchase less of it (I refer to the more desirable 
product as a “high quality” one). Because the consumer is uncertain whether she faces a 
“high quality” product or a “low quality” one, she may make a costly mistake.  
 
The basic model describes a two-step minimization process, which, although happen 
simultaneously in reality, is broken into two parts for simplicity and clarity. In the first 
stage the buyer chooses her strategy. Based solely upon her demand curve, the price of-
fered, P0, and her own belief regarding the product’s credence qualities, the buyer decides 
what will be the optimal quantity she should purchase. The optimal quantity is that which 
minimizes her expected cost from an erroneous choice. As will be shown, although the 
buyer can and will minimize her costs, she cannot eliminate them altogether. This mini-
mum (but positive) expected error is, therefore, her subjective demand for information 
about the product’s physical attributes (the consumer will be willing to pay a positive 
amount of money to reduce her error). In the second stage the seller chooses his strategy. 
Once the buyer has already minimized her cost, the seller decides whether to use a trade-
mark (or other methods of marketing) to convey information about his product’s physical 
qualities. The seller can decide to either inform the consumer about his product credence 
attributes or keep “silent.” If the seller decides to brand his product and convey additional 
(yet truthful) information to buyers, the model shows that such an activity will minimize 
further the expected error cost and will (where the product is a high quality one) unambi-
guously increase sales. Trademarks do so, the argument goes, by reducing the buyers’ 
subjective probability to err. After discussing the informational role of trademarks, the 
model is extended to persuasive branding. 
 
(i). The Consumer Strategy 
 
Assume two linear inverse demand curves for a single product or service which take 
the form: 
 
(1) D1–1: P = a1 – bQ 
(2) D2–1: P = a2 – bQ 
The first, D1–1, stands for a “high quality” product (the no calorie sweetener in the ex-
ample) and the second, D2–1, stands for a “low quality” one, where a1 > a2 > 0, and             
b > 0.161 Note that the difference in the demand intercepts a1 – a2 (to which I refer as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Stevia” is a zero carb, zero calorie sweetener made of herbs and is manufactured by the Steviva Corpora-
tion. 
161 For simplicity I assume that there are two states of nature: a “high quality” product and a “low qual-
ity” one. For a similar assumption see S. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Dis-
closure about Product Quality, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3 p. 461, 471(1981). This arti-
cle is different than Grossman’s for several reasons. Grossman considers two cases, one in which a seller 
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“error span”162) is the per-unit quality difference or, in other words, it is the marginal 
price difference between a high quality product and a low quality one and it is constant 
for every Q. For example, if P1 = 100 – 10Q1 and P2 = 80 – 10Q2, then for every unit Q, 
the consumer values the no-calorie sugar-based sweetener $20 more than if it were a 
high-calorie aspartame-based one. I assume that the only difference in the intercepts is 
due to the credence quality at question.163 
 
 
Figure 1: The Expected Cost Due to Uncertainty 
 
Because of want of information with regard to the tangible product, the buyer is un-
certain about the product’s credence qualities. In the example, she is uncertain whether 
the sweetener is low in calorie and contains no aspartame (high quality product) or 
whether it has lots of calories and chemical substances (low-quality product).164 Put dif-
ferently, she is uncertain whether she faces D1 or D2 in Figure 1. The buyer’s belief about 
the product’s quality can be represented by specifying a probability distribution on Q. 
Because the model assumes that there are only two possible states of the world (high 
quality product versus low quality one), I use θ to denote the probability that the buyer 
                                                                                                                                                             
makes quality statements which are ex-post verifiable and another in which the statements are too costly to 
verify ex-post but nevertheless have some characteristics which are observable ex-post. For example, the 
quality of a car is hard to verify but it is easy to observe whether it breaks down. This paper, on the other 
hand, discusses credence quality which are not verifiable and not observable ex post. In the above example, 
the consumer would not know even post purchase whether the sweetener contains aspartame or is high in 
calories. Also, unlike Grossman, I do not assume that the seller’s statements are truthful or that the con-
sumer can only purchase one unit. Quite the opposite: I assume the seller may want to mislead consumers 
and that the consumer is purchasing a number of units. In fact, I wish to investigate how the number of 
units purchased by a certain consumer is affected by a fraudulent seller. Moreover, Grossman discusses 
warranties as signal for information. He reasons that if the seller does not provide a warranty (or discloses 
that his product is of high quality) the consumer can infer the product is of low quality. In trademarks, 
however, such a separating equilibrium does not necessarily occur. See infra note 170. 
162 Because I show that QC – QA = (a1 – a2)/b, d = |QC – QA| is a linear transformation of the “error span”. 
163 For simplicity I also assume a level of P0 such that a1 – a2 < P0. This assumption simplifies the model 
by insuring that the first minimization process (the buyer’s strategy) could be easily illustrated graphically. 
164 It is easy to think about other examples. For example, a consumer may be interested to know whether 
a product was made in a certain locality (such as Champagne, Roquefort or China), whether a product con-
tains or free of certain ingredients (such as sugar, fat from animals, etc.), whether it is dairy, non-kosher or 
tested on animals, or is hand-made, recyclable, etc. 
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places on the product’s quality.165 More specifically, the buyer believes that the probabil-
ity that product is of high-quality is θ and that the probability that the product is of low 
quality is 1 – θ (where 0 ≤  θ ≤  1). The buyer may decide that the product is of high qual-
ity and purchase QC units or that it is of low quality and thus purchase QA units. If mis-
taken, however—that is, if she thinks the product to be of high quality when it is really of 
low quality—she will purchase QC units and will incur a cost illustrated by the area ACE, 
which is the difference between what she paid: P0CQCO and what she received: 
P0AEQCO. In discrete terms, she will incur a cost which is the summation of the differ-
ence between what she paid for each product (P0) and its value to her (presented by the 
down-slopping demand curve). If she believes (at probability 1 – θ) that the product is of 
low quality when it is actually high-fat she will purchase QA units and incur a loss de-
noted by the area FAC. 
 
But the buyer has a third choice. She can consume any quantity Q such that                    
QA < Q < QC. To find Q* which minimizes the consumer’s error cost I choose arbitrarily 
a quantity x with the only limitation that QA ≤  QA + x ≤QC. x, therefore, serves as a 
“dimmer”: the larger it is, the closer the quantity purchased is to QC; and the smaller it is 
the closer the quantity is to QA. On the extremes, if x = 0 the buyer purchase Q = QA 
units, and if x = QC – QA the buyer purchase Q = QC units. For every x it is possible to 
formulate the general expected error function E(eQ):  
 
(3)  E(eQ) = (1 – θ)SABD + θSGBC  or; 166 
(4)  E(eX) = 
b
aaxaabx
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The buyer, absent any additional information and based solely upon her knowledge 
about the relevant demand curves, will try to avoid the costs that follow from an error in 
the assessment of the product, by choosing x* that minimizes her expected error costs. 
Rearranging the first order condition in equation (4) yields x* (and thus Q*) which brings 
the expected error function to its extremum: 
 
(5)  
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Proposition 1: x* which brings the expected cost to a minimum will be always posi-
tive and the buyer will thus always choose Q* such that QA < Q* < QC. Put differently, in 
a world with uncertainty, the buyer will never chose Q* such that Q* is equal to either QA 
or QC. Proof in Technical Appendix A.  
                                                     
165 It is assumed that the probability of the “high quality” state of the world is known to the seller and that 
the consumer cannot affect the probability of the states. 
166 Or, more generally: E(eQ) = ∫∫ −+−−
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Corollary 1: From proposition 1 and equation (6) it follows that the expected error, 
E(e), is always positive and is unambiguously smaller than the extreme cases where the 
consumer purchases Q = QA or Q = QC. That is 0 < E(eQ*) < E(e Qa) = E(e Qc). See Ap-
pendix A.  
 
Corollary 1 implies that even after the buyer has minimized her error-cost by choos-
ing x* > 0, she will nevertheless have a positive error-cost or, put differently, a positive 
demand for information denoted by equation (6). The buyer will be willing to pay for in-
formation regarding the tangible product any sum of money so long as her minimum ex-
pected cost is higher or equal to the cost of information. 
 
Proposition 2: The higher is the difference in quality d|a1 – a2| (the larger is the error 
span), the higher will be the maximal error the consumer incurs. Proof in Appendix A. 
The intuition behind proposition 2 is simple. The more impact a credence quality has on 
the utility a consumer extracts from the product, the higher is the cost to the buyer from 
an erroneous decision (or valuation of that credence quality). 
 
 
Figure 2: The Relation between x and E(e) for θ = ½ . 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the consumer’s strategy. By differentiating equation (6) we can 
derive θ that brings the expected cost to a minimum. A simple calculation shows that this 
will occur when θ = ½ at which point the consumer purchase x* units and faces an ex-
pected error cost of EMin = (a1 – a2)2/8b. I refer to this point as the “point of ignorance” 
denoted by the letters Ig. The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward. Because 
at the first stage of minimization the buyer has no information about the product—she is 
ignorant as to its credence attributes—she has a 50% chance of making an error.167 Any 
information regarding the product or the service at hand—that is, any (truthful) informa-
tion which will either decrease or increase θ—will unambiguously make the consumer 
better off. But absent such additional information about the product the consumer’s best 
strategy is to choose x* where her expected cost is minimal. If she chooses to purchase     
                                                     
167 The model can be easily extended to cases where the consumer has prior information, in which case    
θ ≠ ½. It can also be extended to discuss cases of false optimism (for example when the consumer possess a 
belief of θ = 0.75 when she should have, based upon the objective information available to her, a lower 
level of θ) or false pessimism. 
Shahar Dilbary: Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs” 
40 
Q = QA or QC she runs the risk of incurring high costs (indeed, the expected costs from 
choosing Q = QA, QC is maximal). 
 
(ii). The Producer’s Strategy 
 
Proposition 3: The stronger the consumer’s subjective belief that the product is of 
high quality (θ > ½) the higher will be the number of units purchased by the buyer. Proof 
in Appendix A. 
  
Figure 3: Summary of the Two-Step Minimization Process (For θ = ½). 
 
Proposition 3 is crucial to the understanding of the provisions of the Trademark Act. 
The profit maximizer seller, being aware of proposition 3, faces two options: He can ei-
ther (a) increase the quality of his product and convey that information; or (b) he can 
cheat and convey false information about his product credence qualities. If he chooses to 
raise his product quality, he can convey that information by using a trademark. The mark 
“Splenda”, for example, has acquired a secondary meaning in the mind of consumers as 
denoting a “no calorie sweetener [which] tastes like sugar because it’s made from 
sugar”;168 “Dr. Price” signified for the consuming public a cream of tartar based baking 
powder—not phosphate;169 “Evian” has become synonymous with natural spring water 
from the French Alps. A trademark that provides positive information will increase θ 
(such that θ > ½), and lead to a higher consumption (the mechanism is discussed be-
low).170 This is illustrated in figure 3 by a movement from the point of ignorance (Ig) to 
                                                     
168 Splenda is made through a patented process that starts with sugar and converts it to a non-
carbohydrate no-calorie sweetener (sucralose). For more information see www.splenda.com. 
169 See for example Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir., 1922). 
170 Of course, the information conveyed by a mark will always be “positive”. This requirement can be 
easily satisfied, however, because each product can be thought of a function of a set of attributes X=A(a1.. 
an)  and every producer may use its mark to highlight a positive attribute of its product. McDonald’s can 
use its mark to impart information not regarding the nutritional value of its hamburgers but rather their 
taste, sanitary conditions and so on. The linguist, Roger Shuy has narrowed down to the message conveyed 
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point F. At this point (F) the buyer’s error costs decreases further (EF < EIg = EMin, Q1 > 
QIg) the result of which is an increase in total welfare. Similarly, if the mark provides 
negative information about the product credence qualities (because of, for example, gov-
ernmental regulation, e.g. labeling requirements) although the buyer will purchase less 
than she would had she been at the “ignorance point”, her error-costs will nevertheless 
unambiguously increase. This is illustrated by a movement from the point of ignorance to 
point G (EG < EIg, Q2 < QIg).  
 
Rather than improving its product’s credence qualities, the seller may choose to cheat. 
In this model, cheating is plausible and likely to occur because it is hard or even impossi-
ble for the buyer to verify the product’s credence qualities. The buyer cannot check the 
active ingredients, processes or location of manufacture. She is at the mercy of the seller 
whose product she chose to purchase. Thus, sellers of low quality products may choose to 
defraud the consumers by providing false information in order to increase their sales 
without incurring the cost of improving their products. For example a seller can tout its 
cheese as being “Roquefort” although it was not made in the French locality. In such a 
case, the defrauded consumer would think she is at point F where in fact she would be in 
point H where her costs are higher than at the point of ignorance. Cheating, as Figure 2 
demonstrates, will result in an increase of the producer’s sales but it will reduce consum-
ers’ welfare at a magnitude of EG – EMin. Furthermore, the model shows that even where 
fraud is implausible, one would expect low quality manufacturers to say very little or 
nothing about their products’ credence attributes. By filling their mouths with water, and 
not conveying any information, low-quality sellers may be able to sell more. Not internal-
izing the buyer’s error cost, the seller will be able to sell x* units at the point where          
θ = ½. But, this will be at some substantial cost to consumers.171 
 
The seller can influence the buyer’ subjective belief by number of methods, one of 
which is using a  trademark. This can be formally presented as: 
 
(7)  θ = ½ + δLT 
                                                                                                                                                             
by the McDonald’s mark to: “basic, convenient, inexpensive and standardized” (see Roger Shuy, Linguistic 
Battles in Trademark Disputes (2000), p. 95-109, 99). One court has held that the prefix “Mc” denotes 
“quality, service, cleanliness and value” or “Q.S.V.C” (Quality Inns International Inc. v. McDonald’s Cor-
poration, 8 U.S.P.Q. 2d. 1633 (Dist. Mass., 1988)). 
171 The model leads to the conclusion that a pooling equilibrium will occur. In this regard the model dif-
fers from the signaling literature which views the presence of a warranties as signal of a good product and 
its absence as a signal to a bad one. In a trademark setting, on the other hand, the fact that a mark does not 
convey information about credence qualities (low or zero branding level) will not lead to a separating equi-
librium. For a separating equilibrium to occur, consumers must be able to observe and compare the same 
attribute in different products. Because a warranty is a signal only of one attribute: performance, consumers 
can infer that seller who does not offer a warranty has a product with low performance. Trademarks, unlike 
warranties, are used to impart information about different attributes. Every seller can use its mark to convey 
information about the attribute its product is most valued for. One would use the mark to convey a informa-
tion about a certain taste, another to convey a certain smell, a third to convey the existence or absence of an 
ingredient, a fourth to convey a process and so on. In such a setting the only thing a consumer may infer 
from the existence of a mark is that the attribute for which the mark has gained a secondary meaning may 
be the strongest quality of that product or at least a desirable one. 
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where δ is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the trademark conveys the infor-
mation that the product is of “high quality” and is equal to (–1) if trademark implies that 
the product is of “low quality”; T is an index of the trademarks’ strength (T is equal to 0 
where the product is not branded and increases with the trademark’s strength)172; and L, 
which I assume to be constant, is the marginal change in the probability θ caused by an 
increase in T. By substituting θ in equation (6) with its formulation in equation (7), and 
differentiating the achieved expression with respect to T, I show that the stronger the 
trademark is the smaller the expected error cost becomes.  
 
(8)  E(e Q*) = ]
4
1[
2
)( 222221 TL
b
aa δ−−  = ]
4
1[
2
)( 22221 TL
b
aa −−  
Proposition 4: From equation (8) it follows that where information is truthful, the 
buyer’s error costs are minimized regardless of the trademark’s sign (positive/negative). 
Whether δ = –1 or δ = 1 it unambiguously reduces E(e) with any increase in T            
( δ∀  dE/Dδ < 0). Proof in Appendix A. This is illustrated by Figure 2 (the seller’s strat-
egy).  
 
B. Extending the Model: Persuasive Branding 
 
I now turn to model Snobbism (I will use interchangeably the terms “famous” and 
“persuasive” to describe marks which influence buyers’ demand by adding a psychologi-
cal freight). While in the basic model above the only effect of trademark was to unambi-
guously reduce buyers’ error cost and increase sales by imparting information about the 
product’s credence qualities, in the case of persuasive marks the outcome is ambiguous. 
This time, a trademark serves two roles. As in any intra-brand setting, it reduces consum-
ers’ error cost and leads to an increase in sales (where δ = 1). However, it also creates a 
pleasant feeling or portrays an image that makes the product more “desirable” or more 
appealing. While in its first hat, as a cost-reducer, a trademark has no impact on prices in 
its second hat, that of creating an aura or a “product-appeal” it does. It increases the de-
mand for the product as illustrated in Figure 3 and thus increases the product’s price. 
Formally, instead of the somewhat naïve description provided in equation (1) and (2), 
I denote the inverse demand curve for a product such as “Ferrari”, “Armani”, L’Oreal 
lipstick and the like, whose trademarks enjoy high popularity, as follows: 
 
(9)  D-1(p, f, n): P = a + ψf(T, ε , n) – bQ;  
  D(p, f, n):   Q = P
bb
fa nT 1),,( −+ εψ  or Q = P
bb
f
b
a nT 1),,( −+ εψ  
Where f (for “famous” or “fame”) is a popularity index, which is a function of T, the 
trademark strength, andε —other factors (such as a pleasant design). I assume that an in-
crease in T increases the product’s popularity (f'T > 0) and that the marginal contribution 
is decreasing (f''T < 0). That is, the stronger the trademark is, the smaller is the contribu-
tion of an additional unit of trademark to the product’s popularity. The demand for the 
                                                     
172 The trademark level T is a function of advertising campaigns (T = F(advertising)). 
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product is thus dependant upon the price, P, and it increases with an increase in the popu-
larity which implies ψ > 0. Note that I no longer assume that an increase in T has no in-
fluence on prices. In the current formulation of the model, the seller has some ability to 
influence the price P due to the popularity of his product in the marketplace. I also as-
sume that the demand is influenced by the number of firms in the market, n. For example, 
in a geographic market where only Armani suits are available, I expect the demand to be 
higher than in a market were consumers can purchase both Armani and Boss, everything 
else being equal. This implies that D'N < 0, f'N < 0 for every increase in n. For this very 
reason it was argued above that enabling producers to sell the same tangible product un-
der different labels and charging different prices would enhance competition and will re-
sult in a decrease in prices. Such activity implies more lines of production and vibrant 
competition at the psychic sphere. The introduction of more firms (that is increases in 
“n”), reduces “f” and unambiguously leads to a decrease in the fame effect discussed be-
low. 
 
By holding the number of firms, n, constant and repeating the methodology of the ba-
sic model it is possible to calculate the correlating quantities QE and QF (instead of QA 
and QC in Figure 1), the error span (d|QF – QE|), the error costs as a function of T, its 
maximum and minimum and the quantity Q* (See Figure 3 for illustration and Appendix 
A' for calculations): 
 
(10)  QE = b
pfa 12 −+ψ , QF = b
pfa 11 −+ψ , d|QF – QE| =d= b
aa 21 −   
(11)  E' (eX) = E(eX) = 
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aaxaabx
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(14)  x* = 
b
aaLT
b
aa )(
2
)( 2121 −+− δ ; 0 < x* < (a1 – a2)/b 
Note that equations (10)–(14) are identical to those yielded under the basic model. 
This is because the increase in T does not impact the error span (d|QF – QE| = d|QC – QA| 
= (a1 – a2)/b) and consequently, x'* = x* (and thus the minimum and maximum error cost 
remain the same). The increase in T does make a different, however, in that it changes the 
quantity Q'*: 
 
(15)  Q* = QA + x* = b
aaLT
b
Paa )(
2
2 21021 −+−+ δ  
(16)  Q'* = QE + x* = b
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2
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b
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b
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b
f TT 0)(1)( −−ψ ] 
Shahar Dilbary: Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs” 
44 
It is now possible to provide a graphical description of the dynamics which occurs 
when the producer decides to persuasively brand his product. An increase in T creates 
three effects.173 First, an increase in the trademark level T increases the “fame” of the 
product and makes it more appealing. This in turn causes to an increase in the demands 
for the product at a magnitude of ψf/b. I refer to this impact as the “fame or psychologi-
cal  effect”. Figure 4 illustrates the fame effect by a right shift of the demand curves. 
Everything else held equal (specifically, assuming P remains P = P0) such a move would 
have caused an unambiguous increase in the quantities the buyer is willing to purchase 
and shift the error span from [QA, QC] to [QB, QD] such that QB > QA and QD > QC. This, 
in turn, would have caused the point of ignorance to increase so that the new point of ig-
norance, xIg, would shift to K (QD < Q'IgK < QB). 
 
 
Figure 4: The Impact of Persuasive Marks on Consumers’ Demand 
 
But the increase in fame also causes a price effect which reduces the quantities at a 
magnitude of (P1 – P0)/b > 0 where P1 is the new price level. This is illustrated by a shift 
on the demand curves from the segment [B, D] to [E, F] which in turn causes the igno-
rance point to shift from point K to I. Lastly, an increase in the trademark level provides 
more intra-brand information about the products credence qualities which increases the 
quantity purchased by moving the consumer away from the new ignorance point (I) (the 
informational effect). This informational effect is of magnitude δL(T1 – T0)(a1 – a2)/b and 
it causes to a subsequent move right on the horizontal line [I, F]. The three effects can be 
easily shown by calculating the difference in quantity before and after the increase in T: 
                                                     
173 Equation (16) is broken down into four components. The first expression is the demand for the physi-
cal product at the point of ignorance (thus it is independent of T). The second expression illustrates the in-
formational effect. It is the increase in demand for the physical product due to the favorable information the 
trademark conveys about the product’s physical qualities. The third expression is the demand for the intan-
gible product which piggyback on the physical one. It is the fame, status or satisfaction the consumer gain 
from consumption. The forth expression is the price effect caused by the persuasive efforts. 
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To sum, persuasive branding will cause the following changes: 
 
(a) A fame effect of 
b
ff )( 01 −ψ ; f = f(T) 
(b) A price effect of 
b
pp 01 −− ; P = P(T) 
(c) An informational effect of 
b
aaTTL 2101 )(
−−δ  
 
Proposition 5: Ignoring the marginal cost of branding k (or put differently even 
where k = 0), the informational effect is finite and reaches maximum where TMax= min 
[1/(2L), 
k
cP
b
aaL )(
2
)( 021 −− ]. Proof in Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 5 means that a monotonic increase in T will “close”, at one point, the in-
formational gap and bring to an end the informational effect leaving only the price and 
fame effects. The intuition is simple: with an increase in T, the buyer receives more in-
formation about the product’s credence qualities. At a certain level of T, denoted by      
TIMax, the buyer will receive all the information she needs about the physical attribute of 
the product. She will know that she faces D1 rather than D2 (assuming δ = 1 her subjec-
tive belief will be θ = 1). Once full information is provided to the consumer she would 
move from the costly point of ignorance to Q = QC where her error cost are 0 (point F at 
Figure 3). At that point, further investment in trademark (an increase in T such that          
T > TIMax) will no longer yield any informational effect. There is no more uncertainty cost 
to be reduced. Thus in a world where persuasive branding is prohibited, the investment in 
trademarks will be finite, even when the cost of branding is zero (k = 0). 
 
In the case of persuasive marks, on the other hand, the producer will continue to 
brand above the maximum level (T > TIMax). This is because in reality, trademarks are not 
only a means to convey information about the product’s physical qualities, they also cre-
ate a new product which piggybacks on the tangible one. The fame effect creates a look 
or signal a social status or a pleasing emotion. It is important to note, however, that once 
the trademark has provided full information about the product’s tangible credence quali-
ties, the two demand curves denoted by D1 and D2 in Figures 1 and 3 will collapse to 
one: the higher demand curve (if δ = 1). Because the information gap is finite (the error 
span does not change with an increase in T), the informational process must reach to an 
end at which point the two demand curves will become one. As of that point, the only 
two effect remaining will be the fame effect and the price effect.  
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This analysis explains one of the major flaws of the “soft-liners’” approach. The latter 
justifies persuasive branding because of its informational effect. They fail to recognize, 
however, that such an effect will reach an end. At a certain level of branding (TIMax) the 
famous trademark would convey the information the product “is a winner”. Any invest-
ment above that level does not serve any informational purpose. Thus even the “soft-
liners” will side with the “hard-liners” and claim that any branding level T such that        
T > TIMax is wasteful. The model above, however, proves that even where the informa-
tional process ends, branding is not wasteful: it creates an intangible product which con-
sumers value and are willing to pay for.174 
 
Proposition 6: An increase in T will unambiguously lead to an increase in both the 
purchased quantity, Q* and xIg (Q*' > Q*, xIg' > xIg) so long as  01 ppf −>ψ  (where      
Pi is the new price level). Proof in Technical Appendix A. 
 
Corollary 6: From proposition 7 it follows that so long as 0ppf i −>ψ , an increase 
in T leads to both an increase in output and prices. 
 
Proposition 6 and its corollary implies that when the condition specified therein 
holds, one may witness the anomaly of an increase in both price and output. This phe-
nomenon has been often discussed in the literature of conspicuous goods. 175 However, 
the conclusion of that literature is that “Elitists” (which are defined as consumers who 
gain utility from the fact that other consumers cannot purchase a certain product) face an 
up-sloping demand curve. This line of the literature argues that an increase in price 
causes an increase in consumption (because fewer people can afford to buy the high-
priced product, it can better serve as a signal of exclusivity and therefore is more de-
manded by those who can purchase it). The literature of conspicuous goods is related to 
the model in that it introduces social desires to the traditional consumer decision-making 
theory. Yet, it differs because its focus is relative consumption. The utility of elitists and 
conformists from a product is a function of the residual or aggregate demand of other 
consumers. Also, it focuses only on visible status-signaling goods and it ignores the psy-
chological satisfaction a product may confer. Thus, a prerequisite in that literature is that 
a product must be “conspicuous” to convey the message of uniqueness or conformism.176 
                                                     
174 Part II above provides some empirical data which evidence this flaw. If, as the soft-liners argue, per-
suasive advertising provides only information about the physical product, we would expect a decrease in 
advertising outlays where the cost of advertising and the dissemination of information decrease. Yet, the 
data show that despite the Internet and other cost-effective mechanisms, advertising expenditures increase 
exponentially. 
175 The literature of “conspicuous goods” distinguishes between “Elitists” (sometimes called “snobs”) 
who prefer unique products (that is, consumers whose purchase decision is based on residual demand) and 
“Conformists” who prefer goods which are popular amongst their peers. In this respect it is important to 
note that this article uses the term “Snobs” (as distinguishable from “Elitists”) in a very different meaning. I 
use the term “Snobs” to refer to consumers who are willing to pay more for the same physical product 
which is available at the marketplace for less (for a similar definition see: Lauric S. Bagwell and D. 
Bernhcim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, The American Economic Review, Vol. 
86 No. 3, 349-373). To avoid confusion I use the term “Elitists” to refer to consumers depicted in the con-
spicuous goods literature as “snobs”). 
176 See H. Libenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Verblen Effects in the Theory of Consumer’s Demand, The 
Quarterly J. of Economics, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May, 1950), 183-207 (defining Conformists as those who prefer 
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In any case, it cannot explain the high premiums charged by sellers of inconspicuous 
goods. 
 
 
Figure 5: The Expected Change in Q, P as a Function of an Increase in T. 
 
The model advanced in this paper, on the other hand, suggests that snobbism (defined 
as willingness to pay more for the same physical product that can be purchased for 
less)177 can occur in the traditional negatively down-sloping demand curve analysis. The 
model shows that under certain conditions an increase in price and output may appear 
simultaneously: not as a cause (increase in price) and effect (increase in output) but rather 
as by-products of an increase in the branding efforts. Put differently, the model shows 
that the increase in price and output are by-products of an increase in the branding level 
and that they occur in the traditional down-sloping demand curve. Intuitively, the proof 
can be shown by using Figures 4 and 5. Even ignoring for this matter the positive infor-
mational effect, a small increase in T will create a fame effect which will shift the de-
mand curves and thus the error span from d|QC – QA| to d|QD – QB| and a price effect 
which will further shift the error span to d|QE – QF| where the new price level is P1.178 
The point of ignorance shifts to point K and then to point I respectively. So long as the 
increase in price is such that P < P2 the new point of ignorance will unambiguously in-
crease which implies an increase in total consumption. At a price level of P=P2 the error 
span is d|QH – QG| where (QA = QG, QC = QH) and the point of ignorance is as it was ini-
tially before branding occurred. At price levels of P > P2 the quantity may still increase 
but at a decreasing pace. At this point, the informational effect and the price effect are in 
opposite direction. The error span (and therefore the new point of ignorance) will be left 
to the original, which will result in a decrease in quantity absent an informational effect 
                                                                                                                                                             
goods which are popular amongst their peers—the opposite of Elitists); Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of 
the Leisure Class (1899); Veblen Thorstein, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Insti-
tutions (1934) p.115-117; W. Amaldoss and S. Jain, Pricing of Conspicuous Goods: A Competitive Analy-
sis of Social Effects (unpublished manuscript, April 2004). See also Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, 
Social Economics, Market Behavior in a Social Environment (2000) p. 25. 
177 For a relatively similar definition see Lauric, Bagwell and Bernhcim, supra note 175, at p. 350 (defin-
ing Veblen Effects as “a willingness to pay a higher price for a functionally equivalent goods, arise from 
the desire to signal wealth”). 
178 Note that d|QC – QA| = d|QD – QB| = d|QE – QF|. 
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of greater magnitude. If, however, the informational effect is positive and of greater mag-
nitude than that of the price effect, an increase in consumption at a lower pace is ex-
pected. Figure 5 illustrates that at P > P3, where the price effect is of bigger magnitude 
than the informational, consumption will decrease. 
 
C.  Disaggregating Informative Branding from Persuasive 
 
As noted above, many scholars make a distinction between persuasive branding and 
informative branding, praising the latter and demonizing the former. The model so far 
assumes only one type of branding, T, whose impact on both the informational and the 
fame effect is at the same direction. Other words, the dynamic of the model is such that 
every increase in T provides more information about the product’s physical qualities (il-
lustrated by a shift of the consumer choice along the error span line) and at the same time 
creates a fame effect (i.e., makes the product more desirable). Thus, in its current formu-
lation the model is incapable of describing the case in which a product is highly famous 
and at the same time provides fuzzy information about the product or a product which 
provides high level information without creating a very luxurious aura. Examples of both 
scenarios are abundant. Beer manufacturers, for example, heavily advertise their products 
using persuasive ads which contain very little informational value. Pharmaceuticals, on 
the other hand, are mainly touted for their qualities rather than on the basis of a magnetic 
appeal. 
 
With a very modest modification it is possible to make a distinction between persua-
sive branding and informational branding. There is no need to assume that some adver-
tisements are wholly informational while others purely emotional. Indeed, every branding 
effort can be often characterized as an hybrid, containing both types of advertising in dif-
ferent magnitude. I denote 0 < α < 1 as the fragment of the branding efforts (for example 
a commercial) which convey information regarding the product’s credence qualities. I 
refer to “αT” as the mark’s informative level. By using α it is possible to redefine θ and 
the error function in equations (7), (8) to be: 
 
(20)  θ = ½ + δLαT 
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Similarly, I define 0 < β < 1 as the percentage of branding efforts which appeals to 
consumer’s emotion and psychology. I refer to it as the level of fame. Substituting f with 
the function Tf β= which consistent with the requirements set above is increasing 
with an increase in T at the decreasing pace (f'T > 0, f''T < 0).179 This formulation yields 
the following outcomes: 
                                                     
179 Note that it may well be the case the both α, β = 1. In such a case the branding efforts will increase 
both the informational and fame effects, as was the case prior to this extension of the model. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper offers a new rational basis for persuasive branding and anti-dilution law. It 
argues that, because of the state of the technology and social norms, consumers cannot 
purchase status and prestige apart from physical products. Nor can they signal their re-
fined taste without being considered rude or presumptuous. Rather, they must purchase a 
package which includes not only the physical product, but also purchase information 
about that product, and an image or a satisfying feeling. To build on Desmetz’ example, 
the orthodox Jew is willing to pay more for kosher food, because its physical characteris-
tics (nutritional value, taste, etc.), the information it receives about a physical credence 
quality (a mark bearing the letter “K” informs the consumer that the process of prepara-
tion was in accord with the Jewish tradition) and a mental satisfaction (practicing a relig-
ion). These three demands are commingled. 
 
The framework set in this article helps to clear the fog which surrounds the nebulous 
anti-dilution theory and the constitutional concerns which have been raised recently by 
scholars. It shows that persuasive branding and anti-dilution law are different sides of the 
same coin: that the latter protects the value the former creates in a mark. Contrary to 
common wisdom, however, the article argues that both producers and consumers enjoy 
the benefit of anti-dilution law. For the producers, anti-dilution is forward looking: it pro-
tects the ability of a mark to attract new customers. For the consumer, it is backward 
looking: it protects the consumer investment from the hazards of an externality. Because 
consumers buy both a physical product and a psychological freight but gain control only 
over the physical product, an externality might occur. A third party may dilute the aura 
for which the consumer paid dearly. By providing a cause of action to producers, the lat-
ter are able to serve their traditional role as the avengers of the public. Not only do they 
protect themselves, but they also protect consumers’ “intellectual property”. The analysis 
thus proves that anti-dilution theory cannot be christened as “a radical and imprudent al-
ternative to the consumer protection model of trademark rights”.180 It also leads to the 
conclusion that producers should be able to command different prices for physically iden-
                                                     
180 Klieger, supra note 23, at 795. 
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tical products bearing different marks without being subject to antitrust liability or in-
quiry. The Borden decision not only has no economic justifications, it may also thrust 
monopoly power upon producers and is in direct contrast to the long standing policy of 
defending consumers in their beliefs. Remedying this asymmetry will unambiguously 
lead to an increase in output and welfare—the paramount end of antitrust law. Finally, the 
model supports the conclusion that in certain products one may witness both an increase 
in price and output. This should not lead to the conclusion that one witnesses the anomaly 
of an up-sloping demand curve. Rather, the model shows that people are willing to pay 
more because they receive more and this can happen in a down-sloping demand curve. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Deriving the Error Cost—Proof of Equation (4) 
 
To derive the error cost first solve equations (1) and (2) for P0. This yields: 
(I.1) QA = b
pa 02 − , Q = x
b
pa +− 02 ,  QC = b
pa 01 − ; 
(I.2) QC – QA= b
aa 21 −  
 
Figure 1: The Expected Cost Due to Uncertainty 
 
Solving further equations (1) and (2) for QA and QC using the equations in (I.1), 
yields PF = a1 – a2 + P, PG = a1 – a2 + P0 – bx, PD = P0 – bx and PE = a2 – a1 + P0. By a sim-
ple calculation it is possible to derive the error cost for the extreme cases where x = 0 or   
x = QC – QA (that is when the consumer decide to purchase QA or QC) and the general 
expected error function E(eQ), for x as follows: 
(I.3)  E(QC) = SACE = E(QA) = SFAC = b
aa
2
)( 221 −  
(I.4)  E(eX) = (1-θ)×
2
2bx  + θ ×  
2
))(---( 02010021 xb
pa
b
papbxpaa −−−−+
 
    rearranging equation (I.4) yields:     
(4)  E(eX) = 
b
aaxaabx
2
)()(
2
2
21
21
2 −+−− θθ  
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Proof of Proposition 1 
 
The proof of proposition 1 is straightforward. From equation (5)181 it follows that     
x* > 0 because both the nominator and the denominator are positive (a1 – a2 > 0 and        
b, θ > 0). Because the second order condition of equation (4) is always positive (b > 0) it 
implies a ‘minimum’.182 Thus, only when the buyer decides to purchase x* such that      
x* > 0 (or Q* > QA) will she be able to minimize her error costs. Equation (5) implies not 
only that Q* >  QA but also that QA < Q* < QC. Recall from equation (I.2), that:               
(a1 – a2)/b = QC – QA. Because  the quantity x* chosen by the buyer (see equation (5)) is 
that difference times the probability of error, θ, and because 0 < θ < 1, it follows that    
QA < Q* < QC. 
 
Proof of Equation (6) and Corollary 1 
 
To derive equation (6), I substitute x* in equation (5) for x in equation (4) and after 
rearranging that expression I receive the minimized expected error cost: 
 
(6)  E(eX*) = ][
2
)( 2221 θθ −−
b
aa ; or E(eX*) = )]1([
2
)( 221 θθ −−
b
aa  
 
Equation (6) is the buyer’s demand for information. Because b > 0 and 0 < θ < 1 it 
follows that the expected error function (and thus the demand for information) is always 
positive. Moreover, it is possible to prove that the expected cost function is at maximum 
when Q* = QA or QC. From equations (4) and (I.2) it can be shown that where the con-
sumer chooses x = 0 (that is QA) or x = QC – QA = (a1 – a2)/b the respective error cost are:  
 
(III.1)  E(QA) = θ(a1 – a2)2/2b; and 
(III.2)  E(QC) = (1 – θ)(a1 – a2)2/2b.  
The two expressions are equal and at maximum, however, where θ = 0, 1 respec-
tively. Because 0 < θ < 1 it follows that 0 < [θ(1 – θ)] (a1 – a2)2/2b < θ(a1 – a2)2/2b, (1 – θ) 
(a1 – a2)2/2b < 1 and thus the expected error will always be smaller than E(eQa) or E(eQc). 
That is: 0 < E(eQ*) < E(eQa) = E(eQc). 
                                                     
181 Equation (5) is the first order condition of the error function in equation (4): 
dx
edE )(
  ⇒   
b
aax )( 21* −= θ >0 
182 The second order condition of the error function in equation (4) is 0)( >=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ b
dx
edE
dx
. 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
The proof of proposition 2 follows directly from equation (6). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Proposition 3 is achieved by differentiating equation (5) with respect to θ, which 
yields the positive expression (a1 – a2)/b > 0. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Proposition 4 is derived directly from equation (8). Because the error cost contains 
the expression 2δ , an increase in T will decrease the error cost regardless of 
whether δ  = 1 or δ  = –1.  
 
Proof of Equations (10), (13) 
 
 
Max E 
PL = 1211211 ' pfafab
pfabfabQfa A +−−+=−+−+=−+ ψψψψψ  
PL = 211121 aaPPaa −=−+−  
PL – P1 = 211121 aaPPaa −=−+−  (alternatively, see graph) 
Max E' = SLEF = b
aaaa
b
aaQQPP EFL
2
)(
22
))(( 22121211 −=−−=−−  
 
Shahar Dilbary: Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs” 
54 
The Error Function 
E(e) = 
2
))((
2
)()1( 11 PPxQQPPx NEFP −−−+−− θθ ; x = QI – QE 
PP = bxPxb
pfabfaxQbfa E −=+−+−+=+−+ 11222 )()( ψψψ  
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2
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2
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21
21
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Proof of Proposition 5 
 
A condition for the occurrence of private branding is that δ = 1. That is, the mark 
must convey “positive” information/image about the products’ credence qualities. But 
this condition, albeit necessary, is not sufficient. Because branding is not costless, another 
necessary condition is that the producers’ costs from branding, denoted by K, is less or 
equal (but not higher) than the benefits from branding. Simply put, producers will brand 
only if the additional profit from a unit of trademark are higher than its cost. More for-
mally, a producer’s decision to invest in a trademark can be presented as follows: 
2
0
21 )()( KTcP
b
aaLT ≥−−=Δ δπ  
Where dП is the additional profits from branding, δLT(a1-a2)/b is the additional quan-
tity manufactured due to an increase in T (see equation (11)), (P0-c) is the markup over 
production183 and B = KT2 is the cost of branding. I assume that the cost of branding is 
positive for every T (B' > 0 which implies K > 0) and increasing (B'' > 0). The assump-
tion fits to real life situations where the stronger and more well known a trademark is, the 
higher is the marginal investment that is required to increase the trademark strength in 
one more unit (T + 1). Under this formulation it is possible to derive the optimal invest-
ment in T, by differentiating equation above with respect to T: 
 
KTcP
b
aaL
dT
d 2)()( 021 −−−=Δ δπ ;  
0
)(
2
)(
2
))((
0 021021* >−−=−−=⇒=Δ
K
cP
b
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bK
cPaaL
T
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Proof of Proposition 6 
(15)  Q* = QA + x* = b
aaLT
b
Paa )(
2
2 21021 −+−+ δ  
(16) Q'* = QE + x* = b
Paa
2
2 021 −+ +
b
aaLT )( 21 −δ  +[
b
pp
b
f TT 0)(1)( −−ψ ] 
It is possible to see that the difference in Q, is the third expression (in brackets) in 
equation 16. Q'* – Q* > 0 if 
b
pp
b
f TT 0)(1)( −>ψ  . Because b > 0 the condition can be re-
formulated as 01 ppf −>ψ . 
 
The Error Function and Distinctiveness 
 
(6)  E(eX*) = ][
2
)( 2221 θθ −−
b
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(20)  θ  = ½ + δLαT 
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183 Like Landes and Posner (2003) I assume that the manufacturer is a price taker and thus the change in 
production does not influence the market price P0. 
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